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3Abstract
This papers examines formation of prices in virtual economy World of
Warcraft, and its interconnection with real economy through Real Money
Trade - exchange of in-game currency for real cash. Paper finds, that
WoW economy is heavily leveraged through this channel, namely that it
determines price level within the game. It empirically shows that causes of
long-run inflation of currency are EUR/CNY FX rate and patches issued
by game operator. Later on author builds general microeconomic model
of artificial scarcity, to explain motivation of game operator to inflate
own currency. Last chapter is devoted to potential of virtual currencies,
argumenting with thoughts of Karl Menger, that these currencies may
be able to compete with real ones. Paper heavily relies on unique data,
collected using software developed by author.
Abstract
Tato pra´ce studuje mechanismy formova´n´ı cen uvnitrˇ ekonomiky virtua´ln´ıho
sveˇta World of Warcraft, a jeho propojen´ı s ekonomikou rea´lnou, skrze ob-
chod hern´ıch peneˇz za skutecˇne´. Hlavn´ım zjiˇsteˇn´ım je fakt, zˇe ekonomika
WoW je vy´znamneˇ ovlivnˇova´na t´ımto obchodem, prˇedevsˇ´ım jej´ı cenova´
hladina. Pomoc´ı empiricke´ studie autor ukazuje zˇe dlouhodoba´ inflace
hern´ı meˇny je zp˚usobena zmeˇnami smeˇnne´ho kurzu EUR/CNY, a aktu-
alizacemi hry ze strany jej´ıch autor˚u. Na´sleduje mikroekonomicky´ model
studuj´ıc´ı motivaci autor˚u k znehodnocova´n´ı vlastn´ı meˇny. Za´veˇrecˇna´ teo-
reticka´ kapitola, vycha´zej´ıc´ı z odkazu Karla Mengera, studuje konkurenceschop-
nost virtua´ln´ıch meˇn oproti teˇm rea´lny´m. Cela´ pra´ce vy´znamneˇ spocˇ´ıva´
na jedinecˇny´ch datech, z´ıskany´ch pomoc´ı softwaru vytovrˇene´ho autorem.
Keywords : Virtual currencies, Quantitative theory of money, Relative utility,
World of Warcraft, Artificial scarcity, Karl Menger
JEL Classification : E31,E41,F14,L16,P40
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4Disclaimer: This work is in many respects simplifying and inaccurate. The
topic which it examines has till now been subject to only few rigorous works,
so there are not many shoulders of giants to stand on. Also it is not supposed
that reader has any knowledge of Virtual economies. Consequently a broad field
of subjects has to be covered in the work, in order to provide understandable
picture of core topic. Hence some auxiliary conclusions and thoughts are backed
by only modest data or reasoning, in order to keep this work informative and
compact.
Credits: Thanks to all, who have up till now (22.5.2009) read this paper.
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The mere fact that the goods and spaces are digital, and are part of some-
thing that has been given the label “game,” is irrelevant. Willingness to pay, to
sacrifice time and effort, is the ultimate arbiter of significance when it comes to
assessments of economic value.[3]
1 Introduction
There are two serious reasons, why rigorous science should pay attention to
emerging phenomenon of virtual economies (VE). Firstly they may be viewed
as most interesting large scale experiments.[4] They are indeed what every ex-
perimental economist needs - living systems where millions of real users eco-
nomically interact with each other, constrained by well-defined yet changeable
rules, in an computer-simulated world, where various measurement is possible.
Second reason, which is perhaps of much more serious interest, is that VE’s
have already become a significant part of real economy. 1
Virtual economies are phenomenon so far nearly unnoticed by economic sci-
ence. Reason for that might be twofold - either the relatively short time for
which VE’s exist in a large scale (roughly 8 years), or because their label of
game which makes them somewhat suspicious subject of study. It is in fact
underlying aim of this paper, to challenge such scientific prejudice, and show
that VE’s may be examined in quite rigorous way. The motivation for such trial
lies in authors belief, that VE’s are most interesting subject for economic re-
search. This is not only because of the above mentioned desirable properties for
economic experiments, but also because their operation poses new insight into
many crucial subjects of economic science including concepts of utility, ratio-
nality of agents, or question of free currencies. This work will in detail examine
mainly the last one, in particular it will focus on analysis of basic macroeconomic
characteristics of one chosen virtual currency.
We will first quickly introduce reader into relevant basic characteristics of
VE’s. Although their mechanics do in many ways resemble real economies, in
some respects they are different, and will need special theoretical treatment.
Regrettably, in this young field there are not many giants on whose shoulders
to stand. Though in order to build a reasonable monetary theory we will need
in some sense to start from the scratch, and create few very crude auxiliary
theories to set basic framework. First we will examine markets with virtual
goods, and their prices formation. Then we will model behavior of agents in
economy - players, farmers and creators of game themselves. Emphasis will be
put on Real Money Trade (RMT) phenomenon - the trade of virtual assets for
real cash. 2
1In contrast to majority of works in the field, this paper does not stress great potential of
VE’s and focuses on their present state. Although the author is deeply convinced of coming
major growth in importance of VE’s, he does not (with exception of chapter 5) regard this
very uncertain subject.
2That means mostly for USD or EUR. As we will see later, these markets already operate
in quite significant volumes. It is perhaps their very existence, which gives us reason to treat
VE’s not as a game or economic experiment, but as space where real business takes place.
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After those basics will be laid, will start with studying core of our interest
- the macroeconomic working of World of Warcraft (WoW) economy. We will
start by measuring the effect of real exchange rates such as EUR/CNY on
RMT prices, and consequently on in-game price levels. Further on we will try
to justify and apply quantitative theory of money, which is (according to the
core hypothesis) more appropriate to be used in virtual, than in real economy.
Econometric examination of those topic will be made possible because of dataset
obtained directly from WoW and from RMT sellers (for details see Appendix).
Then we will move on to examining monetary phenomena - mainly inflation
of Gold (WoW currency. To avoid confusion with precious metal we will spell
it with capital G), its causes and consequences. Afterwards we will propose a
microeconomic model to explain behavior of Gold issuer, and of agents facing
similar positions. Then in final chapter we will propose few new notes to theory
of free currencies (issued by private institution), justified by findings regarding
virtual currencies. Based mainly on original thoughts of Karl Menger, we shall
analyze options for evolution of new payment methods, and oppose them to
current mainstream theory.
1.1 What are virtual economies?
Virtual economies may be very different from Earth economies, in certain well-
defined ways.[3]
Phenomenon of large scale virtual economies emerged in late 90’s. It is con-
nected with rise of Internet, which enabled creation of massive gaming networks,
where tens millions of users regularly enter the game to entertain themselves,
interact with others, or even (as popularly labeled) to live their virtual lives.
So far, this seems to be of little interest from an economists point of view -
some new entertainment good (game) has been developed, and is now widely
consumed. However, recent development suggests, that these networks are be-
coming something more, than an ordinary product of entertainment industry.
It is not hard to observe, that player interaction within virtual worlds starts to
resemble economic activity, rather than “just a game”. It is not only rational
profit-maximizing behavior of players (which after all occurs in ordinary games
like of Monopoly as well), but intensive division of labor and developed internal
markets, which make us use the term virtual economy.
There is however one key property, which is much more interesting on VE’s,
than their resemblance to real economy. It is their interconnection with real
economy. To be more specific, it is the fact, that trade of virtual goods and
currencies for their real counterparts occurs, and it occurs at considerable vol-
umes. To provide some rough picture, estimates of annual exchange volume of
RMT move between 100 million and 2.7 billion USD.[6]
It is perhaps the existence of RMT itself, that makes virtual worlds really
behave like real economies. Because once such link is established, the real-world
agents and firms can engage in activities in virtual world, resulting in real profit.
This is what empirics strongly confirm - [6] estimates, that there is 400.000
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workers employed in “industry” producing virtual goods and currencies.3
In this paper I will try to argue, that such link makes virtual economies
part of global economic system, and consequently their game monies should be
treated as real currencies, which is quite important step from monetary eco-
nomics point of view. This is because virtual currencies are not issued and
operated by any government agency, but by private (hence profit seeking) com-
panies, and they in some sense reincarnate liberal idea of free currencies. Of
course, they do not (yet?4) compete against real currencies or even against each
other, but they already provide a nice experimental setting about incentives of
private issuer able to inflate own money - which today stands as main argument
against free currencies.
1.2 World of Warcraft basics
According to [18], in 2008 there were 6 MMOG’s (massive multiplayer online
games), with population above 500.000 users. This work however focuses on
only one, but by far the largest of them - World of Warcraft(WoW), which in
12/2008 had over 11 million of regular users.[?] The reason for this is, that
many economic mechanisms differ across various games. Even though their
basic principles are more or less the same (therefore we can generally speak of
virtual economies), author believes it is more appropriate to focus on one game
in more detailed manner, to give reader some real flavour of what a MMOG is,
since this is today not a part of general knowledge. In the rest of this chapter,
some basic mechanisms (or rules of game) will be described. Reader should be
aware that game is very complex, and only few relevant basic principles will be
mentioned. For much more comprehensive details see [?].
Characters WoW is not a single world, but is divided into separate realms
(servers). Those are stand-alone economies, between which no transactions are
possible (or at prohibitive real money fees). There is about 150 EU and 250 US
realms, where game takes place. A player enters realm as a character - virtual
representation of himself which moves through virtual world, meets interacts
with other characters present in same realm, and performs various other actions.
A character is bound to one realm, however player is not - he may have multiple
characters across one or many realms. Though he may use only one character
at once, so he can be present only in one realm at a time.
Characters are the only means through which users interact with virtual
world. While active, they basically either engage in economic activity, improve
their abilities or just entertain themselves (=players). Mostly their activity
3It is quite challenging question, whether we should speak of production, when there is no
real output. Deeper examination of this issue poses some questions about concepts of goods
and utility. Answering those is however out of scope of this text.
4Recently, there has been some evidence, that Chinese QQ coin, or Second Life Linden
dollar are currently used as means of payment for some real goods and services. However
reasons for using “game money” in transactions was rather tax and law evasion, than questions
of efficiency. We will deal with this topic in special chapter.
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is some combination of those above. As economic activity we may imagine
obtaining items or Gold, which happens primarily through killing and looting
monsters or gathering resources. Such obtained items and Gold can then be
traded with other players.
Characters differ in many specifics such as race, class, faction - which are
of minor importance for our purpose, their key properties are level (rank from
1-80) and professions (such as fishing, blacksmithing or mining). All characters
are born as level 1 characters, with no professions. By killing monsters and
performing various quests they can obtain higher levels, up to maximum of
80. Level is key determinant of their combat ability, and also prerequisite for
perfecting professions. It also influences many other important game aspects -
particularly ability to kill and loot certain monsters, and to survive in certain
regions, hence gather (mine,fish..) some items present in there.
Economy Character can learn up to 5 of 12 professions, in which he may
then build up skill - generally just by using them repetitively. Professions can
serve for items time-costly gathering (fishing, mining), or for their inputs-costly
crafting (cooking, blacksmithing) from other items. It is important to note,
that some professions require inputs which can only be obtained using other
professions (mining→ blacksmithing), or which are obtainable only by character
with sufficient level. Trade of professions inputs and products is the main engine
of WoW economy, and further on will be in center of our interest.
When two characters meet, they may barter any items or trade for Gold,
however vast majority of trades in WoW occurs through Auction House (AH).
AH interconnects all cities across one realm, and works pretty much like ebay.com
- that means, any player can offer own items for auction, while he sets auction
duration, and base prices for buyout and bid. Until end of duration item is
listed on auction free for bid or buyout. If any player decides to pay buyout
price, he instantly gets the item. If until end of duration there is no buyout,
then player who payed highest bid gets the item (and lower bidding players are
refunded). If no player put a bid, item is returned to seller. AH collects small
fee for item listing (dependent on item price and duration), and also 5 % tax in
case of successfull auction. Most of empirical data used in this work has been
collected through AH, as described in Appendix.
The most valued items in WoW are weapons and armor. These are obtained
either from monster loot, or as a final product of some crafting profession.
They (along with level, and player ability) determine characters chances of being
successful in combat with either monsters and other players. Hence weapons and
armor are both goals and means of production. For regular players, obtaining
better equipment is the far most important use of currency - and reason for
engaging in economic activities.
Arguably the most efficient and reliable way of making money in WoW is so
called farming. It consists of simultaneous gathering resources and killing mon-
sters while repetitively running across certain game areas. Previous paragraph
implies, that efficiency of such farming is practically given by character level,
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equipment (weapons and armor), and player’s skill. Some decent income is thus
available only for high-level characters, who however do not always engage in
this rather boring activity. Instead they (together with some low-levels) obtain
gold through RMT, buying it from Chineese workers - who thus engage in farm-
ing instead of them. This activity is called Gold farming, which is no different
from regular farming, but it’s goal is to sell the Gold for real cash.
1.3 Player’s motivation
In a sociological study MMO players themselves report, that primary motives
for playing are getting sense of achievment and social fulfillment.[13]
Now we have some notion of game mechanics, but in order to examine driving
forces of economy, we need to know the goal, which are characters (and their
players) following. WoW is not a game, which can be won, or even finished. A
player may reach level 80, perfect all professions, gain huge amount of money and
equipment .. but this is usually the main reason why players keep playing, where
their utility is really hidden. It is the social interaction (usually with hundreds
of other players) that makes MMOG’s special among all other computer games.
Aside of mostly economic activities discussed above, there are parts of the
game which are much more social in nature. These are raids, battlegrounds and
arenas, where groups of 2-25 players engage in one-off combats. In raids, the
group fights against computer-driven environment (large locations with mon-
sters). Although there can be some profit made, it’s usually marginal in com-
parison to farming. The only possible material gain is in form of rare weapons
from monster looting. Arguably the main reason of players engaging in typically
1-6 hours long raids is the subjective feel of achievment, and sense of common
work. The case is even better seen in arenas and battlegrounds, where no profit
can be made, not even the levels for killing monsters are gained. Their only
purpose is the combat against other groups of players. There is hardly any eco-
nomic reason behind it, in our analysis we will see successful engaging in these
combats as ultimate utility which the game is player for, and more importantly
- as the reason why players need to obtain costly equipment.
Players typically go to arenas or raids with stable partners, from their guild
(more or less stable social group). The corner problem is, that the activities
are mostly enjoyable only for characters with roughly similar combat abilities.
This narrows down to fact, that in order to enjoy the game, a character should
keep up with his surrounding - in terms of level and equipment. Once he starts
lagging behind his guild, he is no longer useful member of team, which decreases
his subjective utility.
This is where RMT services enter the equation - they basically offer players
a opportunity to replace (time costly) obtaining of equipment, by spending
some sums in real world currency. RMT companies specialize in obtaining Gold
(mostly by using cheap low-skilled labor), and exchange it for cash with players
whose time is more costly, and who want to keep up with their game mates. 5
5Aside of selling Gold, RMT companies typically also offer second type of service, called
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Since the game authors repetitively extend it over time, such race with others
never ends. But it is the very notion of changes, which keeps competition
changing and enables players to enjoy the game for longer period of time.
1.4 Blizzard and WoW
Blizzard, is a company, which owns and runs all WoW realms. It issues new
versions of WoW client software, provides technical support etc. It has two
major sources of income - license sales, and subscription fees. Each player, who
wants to play WoW needs first to make one-off purchase of software license.
Additionally, since WoW release in 2004, Blizzard has released two expansions
of WoW, which introduced new game features, and increased the maximum level
(from initial 60 to 70, and finally to 80). In order to benefit from these, users
had to purchase additional software license. As suggested in previous sections,
further expansions can be expected in order to keep game content enjoyable.
However, more significant income, than from the license sales, raises Blizzard
from subscription fees. These are payed monthly by all players, at fixed level
(13 EUR per month), no matter what time they play or how many characters
they possess. As we will see later on, this income may play important role in
formation of prices within WoW economy.
Blizzard also issues and tries to enforce EULA (End User License Agree-
ment), which legally bans any RMT. This is a immensely important point,
reader should be well aware of, that RMT as main subject of this whole work
is in fact illegal activity. By engaging in such trade, both Gold seller and buyer
violate EULA, and if nothing else, they risk loosing their software license, which
is what Blizzard occasionally does, when it succeeds to detect some RMT. Hence
the trade occurs on secret, decentralized basis, to minimize trader’s risk of get-
ting caught. This fact in particular makes our research quite difficult, since it
limits us to use of secondary data.
Blizzard’s motivation for enforcing the RMT ban is questionable, we may
sum it into four following hypotheses:
1. RMT distorts gameplay experience, so in the long run decreases number
of players. This is an official position of Blizzard[21], and will be addressed
in chapter regarding artificial scarcity.
2. RMT also potentially decreases Blizzard’s profits in more direct fashion.
As some activities are outsourced to professional players (Chinese workers
play the boring parts of online games that Westerners don’t want to bother
with). [39] Desired game achievements are thus obtainable in shorter time,
and player is likely to cease paying subscription fees earlier. We will
expand the argument further later on.
power-leveling. Simply they are payed, for getting player’s character to higher level. Anec-
dotical as it may seem, players really do pay considerable sums to someone else for playing
instead of them. This most fascinating issue is however out of our scope. Only important
point here is, that the need to keep-up with surrounding is really the driving force of player’s
utility.
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3. Since in practice the EULA enforcement manifests by banning some frac-
tion of RMT seller accounts (canceling their software license), some the-
ories exist, that by such behavior Blizzard in fact collects RMT tax, in
form of forcing banned sellers to re-purchase software license [19].
4. Legal issues. Allowing for RMT gives trades within the game flavor of real
business, and opens space for discussions regarding regulation, and more
importantly government taxation.
Nonetheless, occasional RMT sellers banning perhaps distorts, but certainly
not destroys RMT market. What it does, is that it moves whole range RMT
activities into illegal sector - increasing RMT transaction costs, and more im-
portantly for us - it renders most of data about RMT market unavailable.
Property in WoW Legally, all items in WoW belong to Blizzard - this is
why RMT ban may be enforced. However from player’s perspective, until used
for crafting or sold, an item is in his possession. Even death of character 6 does
not lead to losing any item. Furthermore, items are transferable at no costs,
perfectly storable, durable, there is no asymmetric information regarding quality
- so the economy should work quite well. WoW however completely misses one
key desirable property - enforcement of contracts. Apart from simultaneous
barter or AH trade, there is no legal enforcement of trade terms. Consequently,
some basic aspects of economy can probably never fully develop here - such as
loans. It would be hugely beneficial to level 1 character (incapable of raising
Gold) to borrow Gold. But since there is none existent way of forcing him to
repay debt, loans exists only on Guild or other social group level, where legal
enforcement is replaced by some form of mutual trust. Later on we will suggest,
that there might exist some Gold financial market between the RMT companies,
which might work thanks to their existing real world relationships, however such
phenomenon is of little interest to us. Furthermore, many desirable transactions
(such as RMT) are against EULA, hence they can not be enforced legally even if
contract regarding some virtual trade was made in real world. The fact of such
legal vacuum puts WoW among traditional VE’s, whose authors try to detach
them from real world, which is supposed to make gameplay more authentic.
The underlying intention is, that VE’s should not resemble real economies. In
chapter 5 we will shortly examine other VE’s where in contrast with WoW, the
link with real world businesses is allowed, and widely supported by authors.
However here we conclude this chapter by stating, that economic processes in
WoW are heavily affected by non-existent enforcement of contracts, and legal
ban of RMT. These undermine potential emergence of many businesses (which
can be observed in other VE’s), and makes operation harder for those which
already exist. However, this might be one of reasons why WoW is so successful
- as a game, not as Virtual Economy, which emerges merely as a unwanted
side-effect.
6which is nothing irreversible in WoW. Characters are infinitely lived and may be easily
resurrected after death
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2 Price of virtual goods
This section analyzes working of internal WoW goods market, and proposes a
model of internal prices formation. First relative prices are derived using simple
micro model, then with help of quantity theory of money a hypothesis about
determining absolute price level is formed. Finally, by introducing RMT into
model we analyze how Gold farmers might affect the economy. In next chapter
our theoretical predictions will be confronted with empirical observations.
2.1 Goods price determination
We will start by proposing that markets with all goods in WoW are competitive.
Namely, that there are many producers and that equilibrium price of goods is
determined as each competitive price - by unit production costs. Let’s look
closer at mechanics of production to see why.
Goods in WoW are produced either by killing and looting monsters (which
requires certain level), or by gathering & crafting (which requires certain pro-
fession). Obtaining both level and profession is very time consuming - hence
costly in terms of opportunity costs. These can be considered as one-off market
entry costs, which hypothetically could distort competitiveness of market. This
however does not happen in practice, since these one-off entry costs grant a
permanent ability to produce certain good (because level cannot be lost and
profession forgotten). Consequently the number of potential producers is gen-
erally quite high - even the most requiring goods can be produced by roughly
10 % of realm population. This estimate has been obtained by following line of
thought: according to [16] the 15.9 % of total WoW population is in maximum
level (71-80) category, hence capable of all level-determined goods production.
The census for skill-determined goods producers does not exist, however game
mechanics imply, that each character above level 65 can perfect up to 5 of 12
available professions. Hence the fraction of producers of such goods should move
in one-digit numbers. Since production capability for most of goods is level de-
termined, we may consider 10 % of population as reasonably low approximation
of producers count. Given the typical realm population (> 10.000), we may
conclude, that markets with virtual goods are generally competitive, because
the number of potential producers (capable of entering market in nearly zero
time and zero cost) exceeds 1000.
Now, for vast majority of goods in WoW, the number of producers is high
enough, so we can assume their respective markets are competitive. Hence
their prices are formed primarily by unit production costs. Now we will briefly
analyse, how these costs (therefore prices) are structured.
All WoW goods are in some sense freely available in unlimited amount, how-
ever it takes some time to obtain (or perhaps to “produce”) them. That means,
their producer bears no other costs, than those determined by production time,
which denoted as opportunity costs Co. The time of production is either given
by specific game mechanisms - in particular by probability of getting some item
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in result of given action (such as killing a monster, mining a copper vein)7, and
by distribution of resources (monsters, veins..) across gaming area. For craft-
ing professions, there exists also important cost of inputs (other virtual goods,
which need to be consumed during production), however price of those inputs
is likewise determined by their production costs. In the end, we can decompose
production cost of every good into sum of times required for production alone,
and for production of all inputs. 8 So we can formalise first core hypothesis of
this paper as follows:
P (G) =
1
0.95
∑
i∈I
tiCo +  (1)
where P (G) is price of good G, I is set containing good itself and all inputs,
ti is mean time required for production of good i. The absolute coefficient 10.95
follows from 5 % fee, collected at AH.  is random white noise, caused by short-
time market fluctuations
However, equation (1) is perhaps too simplifying. While subscription costs
Cs are same for all players, opportunity costs Co are not - as it follows from
their different productivity, and it denotes the revenue from their most profitable
opportunity available. We will generally assume, there is some distribution of
Co among population. While analyzing a market, for given current price P we
may distinguish three groups of players, according to their specific production
costs P (G,Co):
• P (G,Co) > P these are buyers of good, since their specific production
costs are above current market price
• P (G,Co) ≤ P and P (G,Co) > 0.95P These produce good for own use,
however they don’t sell it to others, since AH fee makes such sale unprof-
itable.
• P (G,Co) ≤ 0.95P Are both producers and sellers of good.
We may easily see, that such market is self-equilibrating. If P becomes too
high, players will shift in direction from group 1 to group 3 - hence the supply
will rise and demand fall, pushing the price down until production of group 3
exactly covers demand of group 1. At this point, price is equal to production cost
of marginal buyer (the person with lowest Co within group 1), or equivalently
7Even though these are stochastic variables, we must realize that thousands of such goods
are produced. Hence using law of large numbers we will further simplify our work by using
mean values, considering them as deterministic.
8Not accidentally this resembles Ricardian labour theory of value. Given that thanks to
near-perfect competition, the price is given by supply side, and apart of some exceptional
cases there is no capital (other than character itself) included in production, it follows that
in WoW is labour theory of value (=price) reasonable assumption.
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to 1.05. production cost of marginal seller (the person with highest Co within
group 3).
We see, that through mechanism described above, relative prices in WoW
are determined. The price ratio of any two chosen items should move around
mean value of their production times (plus production time of all inputs, if
the good is product of crafting profession). Of course, there are many sources
of fluctuations in WoW - farming results are mostly stochastic, the supply and
demand continuously move (for instance demand for most goods typically peaks
at weekends and in evening hours), some players speculate on various markets
etc. However only permanent change of relative prices might happen, when
Blizzard issues patches which alter production times - and it takes some time
till market adjusts etc. In 2008 there have been four such major patches, in
first five months of 2009 we have seen three. These patches generally change
more than production times, and will later get into core of our interest - as a
profit-seeking tool of Blizzard, now we just need to know, that they are only
event able to permanently shift relative prices.
As an example, we may use some third party data from various goods mar-
kets. First look at price development of item Silk Cloth 9, which shows price
stability of good which is subject to no changes. Regardless of temporary fluc-
tuations, price tends to return to single price level - which clearly is determined
by something, arguably by production costs. Then compare with Pygmy Suck-
erfish 10 and Eternal Air 11 - where equilibrium price has obviously changed
at certain time point - which was the date of new patch. Although Blizzard
does not publish such data, we may find further evidence that patch changed
production conditions of Pygmy Suckerfish here [23].
Now we will move on to much more complicated issue - determination of
absolute prices. This topic is tightly bound to our main subject - the RMT. As
I will first argue and later on prove empirically, its existence can distort inner
functioning of WoW economy, especially its price level. In following two sections
we will first examine how price level is determined ideally - without RMT, and
how it might be, according to my hypothesis, determined in practice.
2.2 Prices without RMT
Suppose there is no RMT. All players play for their own pleasure and not for real
life income. If they engage in farming, they do so to obtain Gold, which they
again intend to spend within WoW economy. The economy is perfectly closed
with both items and Gold appearing only according to game mechanisms de-
fined by Blizzard. We already have rough idea that items appear out of nowhere
during farming, gathering or are crafted from other items. How do items leave
game? Some are plainly consumed (for game purposes of no relevance for us -
other than that they provide some utility), used equipment is bound to char-
acter so that it cannot be traded anymore. More importantly - some goods
are consumed during production, so that their value does not disappear from
economy. Finally all goods can be sold to ’vendors’ - for very small but positive
amounts of Gold (for useful goods such as crafting ingredients, this price moves
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around 1/100 of their AH price).
Gold sources and sinks This moves us to second, more important topic -
the Gold appears and disappears through so called sources and sinks. There
are many of these in WoW economy, we will mention just the most important,
starting with sources. Primarily, Gold enters economy during farming - while
looting monsters, character gets random items and Gold. These come at strictly
(Blizzard) defined probabilities 9. Other major sources of Gold are quests -
where character performs some difficult action, again for some Gold and items.
The message here is, that Gold and items appear in economy in fixed ratio.
First and most stable Gold sinks to mention are equipment repair costs and
public transport costs, which are small but almost inevitable needs for each
player. Other typical Gold sinks are fixed costs, which each player needs to pay
for leveling and gaining profession skills. Although these can be seen as one-off
costs, reader should be aware that there is always relevant fraction of realm
population leveling up10. For leveling purposes, also some equipment is needed
- which mostly can be bought from other players at AH, or there is always
some available from vendors - at lower quality, and fixed price (which typically
is much lower than at AH). But, possibly largest amounts of Gold disappears
from economy through AH trade. For each listing there is some fee, and more
importantly 5% tax is cut on each sucessfull trade. Contrary to previous cases,
these costs increase with price level - which will later on play important role for
price equilibration. Last but not least, there is consumption which we will call
spontaneous. There are some items sold by vendors at fixed costs, which cannot
be used during production - yet their consumption brings some utility.11
Monetary equilibrium Above described mechanisms would economist per-
haps call endogenous money. Apart from Blizzard occasionally changing game
mechanics, there is no monetary authority. We may view such setting as a
Friedman rule of monetary growth tied to product. Gold appears and disap-
pears from economy only through player activity, but according to well-defined
rules of game. Further on we will defend following proposition:
Proposition 2.1 (Gold-goods equilibrium) With given player preference and
game mechanics, there is a stable equilibrium ratio of Gold and goods in WoW
economy, which is fixed in the long run.12
Why it should be so? The intuition follows from paragraphs above - since
channels through which items and Gold enter the economy are tightly bound
9These probabilities are not published, however some third parties make serious profit by
maintaining databases with very exact estimates. For getting the flavor, see for example
http://thottbot.com/c5992 section Drops.
10As we can see in [16].
11Nice example can be snowballs or fireworks - characters purchase some of those, with no
other purpose than to impress others and possibly gain some social utility.
12Game is now running for four years, while the game mechanics have changed 7 times
just in last two years. Contrary to standard economic slang, when speaking of long run, we
generally mean several months, short run means weeks or even days.
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together, the ratio of sources is more or less given. Sinks are a little more prob-
lematic - although practically any player activity generally requires consumption
of both items and Gold, this ratio needs not to be stable. For instance, if players
decided to use more public transport, engage more in spontaneous consumption
or sell less items to vendors - all these decisions would imply and increase in
goods/Gold ratio. In short - it is a matter of player preference (hence play
style), whether he brings into economy more Gold or goods. Consequently,
global shift in preference would result into change of G/g.
This is however unlikely - with more than 10.000 players per realm, the
law of large numbers practically denies possibility of preference shift within
months - at least in case when there are no changes in game rules, which might
possibly be the only objective event that might have such consequences. Note
that even though increasing level or profession skill does enhance character’s
productivity, it does not change his net G/g output - which is more subject of
player’s preference.
But such conclusion is not enough to call the equilibrium stable. Absence
of structural shocks does not explain why economy tends to given equilibrium,
or (as we will argue later on) that the g/G ratio is roughly same on various
realms. In short - there needs to be some equilibrating mechanism. Before we
will propose how does it look like, we need one more thing - idea how G/g
translates into absolute prices, because these prices will be the key mechanism
of economy self-regulation.
Quantity theory of money Now we will simply argue, that QTM works
in WoW. First we need address question, why such theoretical leap should be
valid - why theory traceable back to David Hume’s thoughts about real economy
should have anything to say about virtual worlds? As argued in introduction
- because basic mechanisms in VE’s are very similar to real ones, perhaps by
intention of authors to create environment in many respects imitating real world.
Nonetheless - as we will see (and later on empirically validate), QTM is quite
valid for WoW economy. Perhaps, thanks to lack of market imperfections, it is
more valid than it is today for real economy.
So, we state classic QTM as follows:
P =
M.V
Q
(2)
Where in our terms P denotes price level, M amount of Gold in economy,Q
is the volume of items in economy, and V is speed of transactions. Now, we
state, that V stays constant over time, following the same logic regarding stable
preferences of player population, which is same for production, transport .. and
trade. We may omit this constant because price level P is a measure whose
scale is arbitrary. Then we realize, that our equation degenerates to what we
already know:
P =
G
g
(3)
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Where fraction on right side of equation is nothing else than G/g ratio of
Gold and goods, known from previous paragraphs. We built the theory in order
to obtain this mechanism, which we will be able to use as rule for determination
of absolute prices. But prior to that we first need to show that it holds in time
frame short enough for our purposes.
So, why should quantity theory of money work in the short run? Or more
concretely - why should be Gold neutral? Common reasoning for short term
non-neutrality of money, follows from price stickiness. The shock from increase
in M first affects the aggregate demand, raising product. Then in longer horizon
prices adjust returning the product to potential, at higher level of P. In WoW
this should not work for three reasons:
1. The prices are not sticky. Maximum time, an item stays in AH is 48 hours.
If it is not sold by then, it is returned to seller who needs to manually re-
list it on AH. Since majority of sellers use tools detecting price level, they
naturally re-list items at adjusted price. So we can say, that prices adjust
almost smoothly (in terms of hours or days).
2. There is no interest rate in transition mechanism from M to P, pretty
much like in original 19th century QTM. The channel working in WoW
is much quicker - from the moment of M increase, it is only a matter of
hours, before the Gold gets to commodity market. And through increased
demand pushes prices up.
3. More generally, there are also no financial innovations, or other structural
changes in working of WoW economy (aside of Blizzard patches).13 This
denies common argument why QTM does not work in real economy, at
least since 70’s.
4. No interest14 also implies no speculative motive for holding money. This
naturally gives larger importance to transaction motive, which is ground
of QTM.
Advantage of virtual economies is, that they are both compact and very
interconnected inside. In WoW, AH works in manner not far from neoclassical
ideal of Walrassian auctioneer. It is a central trading system, through which
great majority of trade occurs at negligible transaction costs (other than ex-
plicit tax). Price levels of all goods adjust smoothly according to spot supply
and demand, resulting (in case of most traded goods) almost into perfect com-
petition with all producers selling at single price, given by costs of production.
Furthermore, trades occur in zero time. Using those facts, it seems reasonable
to assume, that prices may well adjust to amount of money in economy in short
time. This means, that quantity theory of money does not hold in just long
13Such as 1 hour delay for getting money after successful AH sale, which was introduced in
patch 2.2.0. See http://www.wowwiki.com/Auction House
14There is nothing like interest in WoW at - least for players themselves. Since there exists
quite complicated supply chain of RTM companies, we may not deny possibility, that they do
engage in mutual short term lending, but this is out of this chapter’s scope.
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run (as we know it from real economy), but P should equilibrate according to
changes in M within horizon of days or weeks.
Absolute price level More serious argument against our use of QTM might
be endogenity of money. Earlier we argued that G is endogenous in economy -
which contradicts standard QTM assumption, that money supply is fully exoge-
nous. But, we have in fact even stronger assumption - proposition 2.1, stating
that whole G/g term is exogenous. So, even though money supply spontaneously
changes over time, volume of goods in economy do so in same proportion, off-
setting any backwards effect which P might have on M . But, more importantly,
the proposition states, that G/g ratio is stable. This statement together with
QTM has one quite serious implication:
Proposition 2.2 (Price stability) With given player preference and game me-
chanics, the price level of realm moves around stable mean value.
Earlier we intentionally skipped question, why proposition 2.1 states that
G/g ratio should be stable. By showing that 2.2 is true, we will thus also verify
this earlier point, because when assuming QTM works, propositions 2.1 and 2.2
are equivalent.
Monetary basis equilibrating mechanism Why should realm economy
converge to fixed price level? It is given by nature of some Gold sources and
sinks, which tend to behave like corrective mechanisms. Assume that P got
above equilibrium level P ∗. Then following processes start:
1. Players sell less goods to vendors (G source, g sink), as the AH offers
relatively better prices than usual.
2. Players substitute for consumption of goods with fixed costs - vendor
goods, spontaneous consumption goods, public transport (all G sinks),
instead of buying relatively more expensive goods at AH.
3. AH 5% tax linearly grows with larger prices. Supposing that same vol-
ume Q of goods is traded, = 0.05Q(P − P ∗) more Gold disappears from
economy through AH tax than in equilibrium.
Likewise in case that P ∗ > P analogical effects behave in opposite direction,
creating again equilibrating pressure.
Note that points 1 and 2 to some degree neglect point 3. By stating that
AH supply rises and AH demand falls, we cannot be really sure how Q will
behave outside equilibrium - which makes equation in 3 slightly inexact, but
still relevant argument. More importantly, rising AH supply and falling demand
imply what we are trying to show - that AH prices go down, possibly back to
P ∗.
Now we see importance of fixed prices in equilibrating process. They do
serve as nominal anchor to variable ones, present at AH. Players substitute
2 PRICE OF VIRTUAL GOODS 20
Figure 1: Average Gold price index across various Realms
between both according to current AH price level, making the economy return to
equilibrium. Now we more clearly see relevance of our assumptions - preference
stability, and game mechanics. Stable game mechanics imply unchanging fixed
prices (transport,vendor goods...), serving as anchor of economy. Unchanging
preferences then guarantee stable substitution rates between goods with fixed
and goods with variable price.
Empirical observation We can hardly perform some straightforward test for
propositions above. Since we cannot obtain data regarding player preferences,
our evidence will be only indirect. We will study development and distribution
of price levels on various realms, using data collected from 17 realms - from
which we have computed panel of two price level indicators - Average price
index and Minimum price index(API, MPI)15.
First have a look at API development on 10 European realms over 33 days
at figure 1. Later on, these data will play key role in our computations, but now
we are only interested in one thing - price level stability. On the first glance at
figure, our hypothesis seems valid. With exception of single spike each of realms
seems to fluctuate around stable mean.
The spike is obviously formed around date of 3.1.0 patch release, which oc-
curred in middle of our measurement. This was rather unlucky event, as it
15For details see Appendix
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caused sharp fluctuation and created serious leverage points in data, possibly
worsening our further results. Nonetheless here it is useful for showing serious
effect of game patches. Even though both the figure, and our further compu-
tations reliably show only mild change in equilibrium price level, we see that
the spike starts before the patch. This specific patch did possibly not introduce
much serious changes to game economy, but such thing is never known prior
to announced patch date. Consequently, players with experience from recent
patches form some expectations and adjust their behavior. In later chapter we
will provide hypothesis explaining why the spike heads upwards. Now we are
satisfied with observation that population of players is broadly aware of serious
changes, which patches may do to economy - which supports importance of our
stable game mechanics assumption.
Moreover, we should notice speed of price adjustment after spike - to new and
relatively stable price level. From that we see, that our earlier remarks about
QTM working in short run could be justified. Even though we cannot assume,
that it is a general pattern and that all patches deliver their result so quickly
(some deeper structural changes might take more time to manifest), we get at
least the rough idea about smoothness of adjustment, pushed by competitive
markets. Likewise we should remember earlier figures 10 and 11 showing basis
of such adjustment by zooming to single market.
Now, to analyze monetary equilibrium more rigorously, we will run a simple
regression to estimate effects of time, realm-specifics and 3.1.0 patch on price
level. Dataset consists of 33 daily price observations on 10 European realms.
The estimated equation follows:
MPIT,R = α+ αR + β1T + β2Patch (4)
Where αR is specific dummy variable for each realm R, T is time in days,
and Patch is dummy which equals 0 prior, and 1 after patch. We leave only one
Patch dummy because the patch effect should arguably be same or very similar
at all realms. Results are following:
Parameter αR T Patch
Coefficient -0.09 to 0.12 0.003 -0.16
P-value all significant 0.002 0
N 330
Adjusted R2 0.62
First important result to notice is solid adjusted R2 value. We explained 60
percent of price level variance using only linear trend and 10 dummy variables.
Without spike, for which we did not treat at all, explained variance would be
probably even more. This leads us to conclusion, that (at least on our short
data) we observe strong equilibrating tendency on each realm.
Secondly, the −0.16 parameter at Patch variable is strongly significant. This
is also consistent with our theory, implying that 3.1.0 patch reduced equilibrium
price level by 16%. Notice, that players did possibly anticipate rather inflation-
ary patch. Their consequent short-term decision to decrease money holdings
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buy goods is perfectly legitimate explanation for temporary price level increase
- which we observed prior to patch.
The only disturbing result is the significant parameter T . Although we may
argue that our small sample implies inexact results when regarding long-run
equilibrium, especially thanks to patch adjustment, the significance is high and
estimated effect of 9% change over 30 days is not negligible. In next chapter we
will offer some explanation, but now we are about to adress different result.
Distribution of realms All WoW realms are divided into three basic groups
according to their location - USA, Europe and Asia. Across European realms
there is further language division to English, German, Spanish, French and
Russian. It is important to be aware that there is no further geographical
division - my research took place mainly on English and German realms. We will
assume that their populations consist primarily of English and German speaking
countries citizens, plus portion of minority language groups from Netherlands,
Italy, Poland, Romania etc. With exception of dominantly Czech Drak’Thul
realm, author is not aware that population of any other realm is seriously biased
from suggested mean, so we will suppose that other servers populations consist
of random mixture of above mentioned nations.
Why this is important? When we will discuss differences across realms, the
natural question will raise, that different nationality may imply different prefer-
ences - even when they regard uniform virtual worlds16. Such point is perfectly
valid, but hard to prove - as we cannot observe population structure. Further
on we shall naturally suppose and treat for differences among servers. This
follows from simplifying view, that realm populations are randomly drawn from
European countries. To show the reader that such view is not so unreasonable,
we offer at least modest evidence using our price data:
If realm populations (which are mostly greater than 10.000) were drawn ran-
domly, law of large numbers suggests, that their distribution should be some-
what normal. If we according to out earlier hypotheses assume that their aggre-
gate distribution manifests through their preference into price levels, we should
observe equilibrium price levels to be normally distributed as well. So we com-
puted all time average price indices and tested them. The Lilliefors test for
normality of sample did not deny zero hypothesis, that average price levels on
sample of 17 (both US and EU) realms are normally distributed, with p-values
0.37 and 0.5 for API and MPI respectively. Message which this result tells us
is, that although there is some heterogeneity among servers there are no clear
outliers, or separate groups of realms (such as US or German), which signifi-
cantly differ from rest of population.
Time trend In regression (4) we saw significant time trend T , which raised
legitimate doubts about our long term price equilibrium hypothesis. Ongoing
movement of price level would suggest permanent changes in economy’s Gold
16 Especially when considering RMT where differences in real wealth might cause different
demand.
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stock, which would not be offset by change in goods volume. In fact,it is quite
popular view that each realm economy does spontaneously evolve according to
some general time pattern. This theory states, that the age of realm matters -
after it is online for longer time, some items or Gold accumulate within economy,
more players reach level 80 and perfect their professions etc., which should lead
to serious in-game price movements - as the server becomes more mature, both
supply and demand on various markets would shift in some manner, reflecting
changing needs of economy.
Using our data we can raise serious doubts about such theory - whereas it
may be possible that conditions on certain items markets do change, economy
as a whole is more or less stable. At least from perspective, which interests
us - that there seems to be no development in aggregate price level over time.
To show this, I made a snapshot17 measurement of price level on 16 European
realms. I also obtained comparable data for one US based realm, which is also
included in following table:
Realm Realm API MPI Average(MPI)
age price index price index
Eonar(US) 53 0.71 1.06
Aggamagan 52 1.04 0.98
Emerald Dream 52 0.8 0.73
Al’Akir 52 0.92 0.94
Alexstrasza (DE) 52 0.8 1.08 1.019
Aegwynn (DE) 52 1.09 1.04
Alleria (DE) 52 0.76 1.1
Argent Dawn 52 0.86 1.09
Aggramar 52 0.75 1.14
Arathor 52 0.89 1.03
Drak’Thul 41 1.02 1.04
Eonar 38 0.72 1
Aerie Peak 36 0.71 1.11
Alonsus 33 0.8 1.2 1.04
Anachronos 28 0.97 1.1
Terokkar 7 1 0.96
Colinas Pardas 2 1.73 0.87
Realm are sorted by their age - time from their launch date in months.
The snapshot price levels move around mean value 1 with standard deviation
of 0.12, caused by short term fluctuations and differences in realm population
preferences. Important finding here is, that average price level of old (52 to 53
months), and young (2 to 41 months) realms are not significantly different. As
they are 1.019 and 1.04 respectively, passing two-sided t-test with p-value 0.71,
17By snapshot is meant an measurement of average price level over single week. Since WoW
economy typically moves in weekly cycles, such time frame is long enough to provide robust
measure, but also short enough not to be biased by any longer time trend.
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which does not deny hypothesis that populations are not same at any thinkable
level of significance.
This result means, that observed trend T has not long-term effect. We may
therefore conclude, that its significance was caused rather by small dataset, and
patch adjustment process, than by some ongoing development of price level.
But we will not. Since framework sketched in this chapter has clearly no valid
explanation for medium run price shift (which we observed), we shall propose
alternative explanation that allows for such event.
2.3 Prices with RMT
There is perhaps one thing a bit puzzling on data we saw in previous section.
Why are the equilibrium prices so similar. Why do closed economies, which are
not interconnected at all, differ only in such small degree - after all standard
deviation of 12% is not much, and speed of adjustment is way too quick even
for nearly perfect markets. In the spirit of our recent propositions we could
argue that it is the similar preference of player populations, and self-regulating
mechanisms of economy in form of nominal anchors, that keep realm economies
within tight boundaries. Such argument is perfectly valid and hard to falsify.
Instead of trying to do so, we will offer an alternative theory of price formation,
which will hopefully provide even better explanation and also an answer to our
problem with significant time trend.
When we look at figure 1 again, we see that price indices are obviously
correlated. Some of this correlation might be explained by weekly play cycles,
but not all of it. Starting with time trend and following with non-linear mutual
movements, there needs to be some factor that affect all realms. Since we know,
that realm economies are not interconnected, we will need to look outside - for
some objective condition, other than Blizzard patches, that might affect realm
economies. In next two chapters I will argue, that it is the development of
real-world foreign exchange market, that affects price level within the game -
through RMT channel. That time trend we saw earlier was not really a time
trend, but an adjustment to changing exchange rates between euro and yuan.
But before we get to that we need to analyze carefully RMT market to see what
is happening there.
Gold farming business How does a Gold farming company look like? For
production of Gold you don’t really need much - just computers with Internet
connection, valid WoW subscription ... and a lot of workforce. By workforce we
generally mean some qualified staff taking care of distribution channels, website,
research18 etc., but most importantly players - who even need not to be literate,
just have to be able to play the game. When it comes to farming, the job is
18Yes, research. With constantly changing game environment, development of new play
techniques is needed to maximize worker productivity. Although there is plenty of literature
advising regular players how to make Gold most efficiently, professional players might have
most serious interest in further developing those techniques - in order to gain some competitive
advantage.
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easy to learn - purely mechanical, repetitive and boring. And what we do with
such type of work in EU and USA? Right, we outsource it to China19.
This is also how it works it reality. Companies engaging in RMT are mostly
US or EU based, however great deal of their workers - especially low-skilled
ones live in China. It is quite straightforward, since online games such as WoW
might be played wherever is Internet access. In some sense, RMT is ideal
industry for outsourcing - it is labor intensive, there are no transport costs,
no information asymmetry related problems, almost no intellectual property to
steal, and small needs for capital investment. Headquarters in developed state
takes care of sale channels, Chinese workforce does the rest. Also there are
reports about purely Asian RMT companies - which manage to engage in end
sales too. Possibly this is not the typical case - since RMT contracts are illegal,
hence not enforceable reputation of US or EU located seller is some competitive
advantage. In response, purely Asian companies typically offer Gold at slightly
cheaper prices.
RMT market structure is rather even more complicated, and full vertical
integration is not common. Most gold farms cannot reach foreign customers di-
rectly, so they rely on international brokers to distribute their commodities.[12]
In other words, there exist longer supplier chains, not only to reduce costs and
increase flexibility, but also to deceive. Blizzard constantly hunts for Gold farm-
ers, and repetitive transfers within company would perhaps be quickly traced.
Frequent switching intermediary suppliers reduces the risk of getting caught,
and loosing account together with all accumulated Gold. To further reduce the
risk, RMT companies try to hold as little Gold as possible. They can afford so,
because through flexible adjustment of workforce or some of great number of
suppliers, they are able to replenish Gold stock on any realm within hours, or
days at most. A last point regarding we need to make, is to recall that farmers
make they money (not surprisingly) through farming. They repetitively kill
monsters, and gather resources - which is both very time consuming - to obtain
items and Gold. Then they sell collected items - some of them to vendors, but
most income comes from AH sales.
However here we will not deeply examine market structure. Important hy-
potheses following from above are these:
1. RMT markets are competitive, hence their prices are mainly driven by
Gold production costs.
2. Gold production costs consist mainly of farmer’s labor costs.
3. Farmers do not accumulate high Gold stocks.
4. Farmers obtain most of their Gold through AH, which has two following
consequences:
19Why China, and not for example India? Farming industry is mostly in China - in 2008
BBC used estimate of 80% [25]. Without further evidence this work supposes that majority of
Gold farmers is located there. For possible explanations (regarding Chineese absent language
skills and preference for gaming) see [24]
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5. With RMT, AH markets become even more competitive
6. Farmers hourly revenue is dependent on AH price level
Absolute price determination II. Now, we can revisit our earlier equation,
used for determining relative prices within WoW, which is now about to get quite
new meaning.
P (G) =
1
0.95
∑
i∈I
ti(Cs + Co) +  (5)
Only new term in equation is Cs, which stands for monthly subscription fee,
payed to Blizzard. Provided that one month means limited amount of playtime,
it is valid to assume, that its (say hourly) fraction translated into price .. which
brings us to much more important point. Although rest of equation has not
changed, the accounting unit did. In this chapter, we will now denominate
in-game prices in yuan(CNY), and not in Gold.
How should that be useful? First, look closer at the Co parameter. We know
that it is given by production capabilities of given economic agent - but is this
agent a game character, or is it the real player? Up till now, we assumed it was
a character. Without RMT link to real world there clearly is no sense in using
other units than Gold. Things change, when there is significant proportion of
professional players, who see their gaming as economic activity leading to real
income. They will naturally recalculate in-game prices into yuan, or whatever
currency they wish to earn. In this chapter, I am going to defend following
proposition:
Proposition 2.3 (Price level determination with RMT) Given stable game me-
chanics and player preferences, if activity of Gold farmers on one realm is above
certain threshold, then AH price of each good denominated in yuan moves around
stable mean.
Up till now, each player engaged in production of virtual good, in which he
was most efficient. Prices were determined by productivity of various characters.
This is about to change, when we allow players to trade Gold for USD/EUR.
Underlying hypothesis of this chapter is, that once this happens, some players
begin to optimize their virtual world behavior with respect to the real world
costs. For our model it means, they start substituting between in-game and
real life production.
Once this happens, the fraction of players which is more productive in real
world stops engaging in production of virtual goods at all.20 Analogically, those
20The objection, that some players may consider virtual goods production itself entertaining
and will not cease, even if they are much more productive in real world, is perfectly valid.
Here we argue, that after introducing RMT only part of players changes pattern of behavior.
After all, WoW is primarily a game and is supposed to be entertaining most of the playtime.
Although many players consider farming and increasing in skill or level unpleasant (after all,
these activities are called grinding in player’s slang), we may not deny a hypothesis, that
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players whose productivity in WoW is relatively higher than in real world, will
shift whole their productive activity into virtual world. Reader should note
that this model outcome might be quite close to observed reality. Recent (2008)
estimates speak of 400.000 farmers [6], grinding full time in virtual worlds,
mainly WoW, and selling their virtual currencies and other items to players
from Europe and USA - who possibly do not farm at all. While there were
roughly 4.5 million of WoW players in those continents at the time [28], it is not
unrealistic to assume, that relevant part of them did buy Gold through RMT.
Now, although the pricing model remains almost unchanged, by choosing
different unit we get quite different picture. It is indeed again a Walrassian
equilibrium players produce and sell virtual goods, but the other part engages
purely in real world production and buys virtual goods. Here we must note
that trade between those two occur indirectly. Virtual goods is not sold for
real assets, but for Gold at AH. Gold (and only Gold) is then traded for real
currencies. This follows not from the logic of the model (nor it is against it),
but is simply the institutional arrangement, which has apparently evolved as
most efficient.21
Again, we may divide players into three groups according to their individual
opportunity costs Co (which are this time denominated in yuan). By CIN we
denote opportunity costs in game (their Gold productivity times RMT exchange
rate), and by COUT their real world productivity in yuan . Additionally we
introduce RMT transaction costs TC, which in fact aggregate many factors -
transaction costs of RMT in strict sense, risk of getting banned by Blizzard for
RMT, and possible subjective disutility from performing action which gaming
society disapproves. So, after introducing RMT into our model, our original
three groups will transform into following:
• COUT < CIN + TC Gold farmers. By playing WoW they attain best real
income they can get.
• CIN +TC > COUT > CIN Regular players. They work in real world, but
also farm in game to cover own Gold expenses.
• COUT > CIN + TC Gold buyers. They are very productive in real world,
so they are willing to sacrifice TC, and buy Gold for real money, instead
of spending their precious time by farming.
There is no reliable source for comparing numbers of RMT versus non-RMT
players. Since RMT itself is illegal, unethical one-off transaction unobservable
by third party, there is probably no way for getting the data directly. 22 Ar-
guably the prohibitive TC term might make group 2 very large, at some point
there still is some positive utility connected with them. This however is equally true for real
world jobs. For simplicity we shall leave this issue out, much like many classical aggregate
labor market analyses do, and focus on substitution driven by financial stimulus.
21Not a minor reason for this outcome was perhaps ban of virtual items trade at ebay.com
[22]. However, apart from really high-cost trades, low transaction costs (5%tax & fee) of AH
trade practically elliminates economical feasibility of trading goods outside WoW.
22 In early sociological study[14], 22 % of 1923 respondents reported, they at least once
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Figure 2: Perfect competition on RMT market
it might even eliminate Gold farming (which would move economy to non-RMT
equilibrium described earlier), by reducing size of group 3 to zero. This is be-
cause size of group 1 is determined by group 3. Like we pointed out earlier -
there is perfect competition among Gold farmers 23, so once their price is given
(as hourly productivity CIN ), it is the demand for Gold, that determines actual
RMT volume. Intuitively - there are plenty of farmers in China, ready to de-
liver as much Gold as group 3 demands (at fixed RMT price). Hence from now,
further on we will use simple perfect competition model 2.
To show, that such approach is reasonable, we run following regression:
log(RMTQR,S) = α+ αR + β1log(RMT
P
R,S) + β2T + β3Patch (6)
Where RMTQR,S , RMT
P
R,S are daily prices and trade volumes reported by
Swagvault RMT company for each realm. αR is again realm-specific dummy
variable, T is time in days, and Patch is dummy which equals 0 prior, and 1
after patch. Results are following:
Parameter αR log( RMTP ) T Patch
Coefficient -0.12 to 0.32 0.24 -0.0015 0.05
P-value 11 of 15 significant 0.07 0 0
N 1097
Adjusted R2 0.66
Here we see that on RMT market, price is not24 significant factor for ex-
plaining volume sold - which confirms our hypothesis of flat supply curve. To
bought virtual currency. Although this result is doubtfull both in terms of sample size, and
answer reliability, it can at least provide a picture, how developed was RMT market as early
as in 2005.
23 With the increasing number of gold diggers entering into the profitable industry since
2006 and strict policies from game operators against gold farming, the profit has fallen
sharply. Many workshops went bankrupt as a result of the frequent bans from game oper-
ators. The RMT market has changed from a high-profit industry into a relatively stable
business. The competition in the RMT market in China is very fierce.[30]
24Note that analogical regression without logarithmic transformation got very similar re-
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get such result, we needed to control for realm specifics - intuition here is, that
on each realm there is different equilibrium RMT price (later on we will explain
this fact through differences in in-game equilibrium price levels). Now we (on
reasonably large sample from 15 realms) that yuan denominated RMT price
and volume are unrelated.
Note, that now committed a statistical sin, by extrapolating from one ob-
servation (one seller), to whole population. But in this case, it probably does
not distort reliability of our findings. This is because we found, that one large
seller has flat supply curve 25. We might have seen upwards sloping curve, and
still argue, that many of these will aggregate into nearly flat supply (like it is
common in Keynesian AS framework). Since we saw flat curve even in case of
one seller, we thus can even more strongly argue, that many flat curves will join
into flat aggregate.
Last result to mention is again significant time trend, which we can only
explain by shift in demand. How come, that such movement apparently occurs
jointly on 15 realms? It is quite unlikely, that it is result of shift in preferences.
Again we point to next chapter, which tries to explain such trend (of yuan
denominated demand) through trend in EUR/CNY exchange rates.
Yuan denominated costs Later on we will broadly rely on one simplifying
assumption, regarding RMT market: that whereas European Gold buyers earn
money in euro (which is quite reasonable assumption), Gold Sellers bear their
costs in yuan. To show, that this is the case (that for example price margin of
US or EU based sellers does not account for major part of the RMT cost) we
should at least roughly estimate what might the cost of Gold production be.
Note, that our estimate will tend to undershoot the proportion of costs in yuan,
since also other parts of Gold-farming might be (and most likely are) outsourced
to China26.
The crucial figure of farmer’s wage is quite hard to answer - the sources
widely differ and/or are possibly outdated. We can find statements as: The
salary for farmers ranges from 40 USD to 200 USD per month.[12] or Chinese
worker earns 56 [USD] cents per hour [15]. We will try to elaborate rough
estimate, by supposing that work farmer needs to be about as qualified as low-
end manufacturing worker.
The hourly manufacturing wages of worker in China are roughly 0.81 USD
27 Further on we suppose, that farmer’s wage should be slighly lower. This
sults, and showed RMTP even less significant (p-value 0.16). We rather chose to examine
logarithmic one, whose parameter size is easier to interpret.
25In fact we did not. Our finding of unrelated P and Q might be as well interpreted using flat
demand - which is unreasonable because since there are no increasing marginal costs of Gold
production, such market would have degenerated into some monopoly or oligopoly structure.
Other explanation could be supply and demand jointly shifting in either horizontal or vertical
direction - which seems really complicated. Therefore we conclude, that from these options,
flat supply seems most plausible.
26Including customer support and in-game Gold delivery
27It is difficult to obtain reliable data regarding labor market in China. This figure has been
estimated as follows: [1] records the year 2002 average hourly wage in China’s manufacturing
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is because of better nature of job - it intuitively fits that farmers themselves
view gold farming as very pleasant job. For example [2, 154] even considers
pleasure from the game to be in fact part of farmers reward as follows: Total
Compensation = wage + fun. From theory of compensating wage differentials
it follows, that farming should be paid below average manufacturing wage, say
0.7 USD.
Further on we assume that productivity of worker fully devoted to farming
might be about 100 Gold per hour - which is my conservative estimate based on
various gold making guides such as [?], and own experience. Now, we get that
costs of farming for 1000 Gold are 0.7 ∗ 10 = 7 USD. Currently Gold sells for 13
USD in average, so we see that farmer wage may account for roughly half of total
Gold costs. Since we argued, that this estimate should tend to undershoot total
fraction of production costs in yuan - we may view our simplifying assumption
as plausible.
Gold price level After small roundabout, we can return to main question
of this section - determination of in-game prices. We already saw, how yuan
denominated price of item is determined by its production costs. If for example
one worker is able to produce 5 Iron ore per hour, and his hourly wage is 10
yuan, then price of Iron ore should be roughly equal to 2 yuan. Its price on AH
will be as stable, as competitive is Iron ore market. If Iron ore is one of many
items, that Gold farmers typically produce for profit, then variance of its price
will be very small. The stability of prices is again achieved through mechanism -
if Iron ore is undervalued, farmers start looking for more profitable production,
and reduce supply till price returns back to equilibrium.
So far, we have made no clear assertion regarding Gold denominated prices
with RMT, but the reasoning is quite straightforward. In this chapter we assume
stable Gold - yuan exchange rate RMTP . So the Gold denominated prices can
easily be computed from yuan prices. Before we will release this simplifying
assumption (under which we are able to explain cross-realm differences, but not
time trends in equilibrium in-game price level.), we will provide an empirical
proof of proposition 2.3 in form of slightly altered regression we already used in
(4):
MPIT,R ∗RMTPT,R = α+ αR + β1T + β2Patch (7)
Only term which changes is the response variable - which is multiplied by
(cross-seller)average yuan spot RMT price at given realm.
sector as 0.57 USD, while averages in various subsectors vary from 0.41 to 1.47 USD / hour.
From [20] we know, that from 2002 to 2006, Chinese average (yuan-denominated) manufac-
turing wages rose by 75%, while yuan appreciated against USD from 8.3 to 6.8 CNY/USD.
Altogether, this gives us very crude estimate of 0.57.1.75. 6.8
8.3
= 0.81 USD per hour.
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Parameter αR T Patch
Coefficient -20 to 9 -0.02 -12.95
P-value 6 of 10 significant 0.74 0
N 330
Adjusted R2 0.71
Here we finally see that time trend is not significant, as proposition 2.3
predicts. Even though we saw time trend in original price index data, it was
probably offset by opposite development of RMT price. Further we should no-
tice, that even without significant time trend, we explained 9% more variance
of response variable than in earlier regression (just by server and patch dum-
mies!). This leads us to surprising conclusion, that by multiplying in game price
index(MPI) by RMT exchange rate we reduced its realm-specific variance, leav-
ing larger proportion of cross server variance, that is explained by dummies. In
other words we came to most interesting finding, that price level on each realm
is more stable when denominated in yuan, than in Gold. Question of factors
determining Gold prices are addressed next chapter.
3 Inflation in World of Warcraft
In previous chapter we have closely examined, what mechanisms keep WoW
economy in given equilibrium. We have barely touched the question how such
equilibrium is determined, by broadly stating that is is a matter of player pref-
erence. In this chapter we are about to address this topic much more deeply
- we shall try to show, that equilibrium price level is heavily affected by de-
gree at which RMT occurs on given realm28. In particular we will show, that
EUR/CNY exchange rate affects in-game price level through RMT demand. In
the end we will deny popular opinion that Gold farming itself causes ongoing
inflation in WoW.
RMT supply determination For our analysis we will use one crucial propo-
sition, which is a consequence of our previous argumentation regarding perfect
competition on RMT market. We already know, that farmers mainly obtain
their Gold through selling goods at AH. Then, the mean hourly Gold produc-
tion of average farmer is determined only by game mechanics and price level29.
Finally on perfect RMT market, price is driven by unit production costs. Which
has one very useful implication:
Proposition 3.1 (RMT price determination) Supply-determined yuan/Gold price
on RMT market is a function of game mechanics, in-game price level and (yuan)
farmer wage. In long run it increases with wage and falls with price level.
28Which is no deviation from earlier proposition of equilibrium determined by player prefer-
ence. Recall that intensity of RMT is determined by transaction costs TC, given by objective
conditions and player preference.
29We no longer account for differences in player abilities, which do not matter in aggregate.
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Note that this proposition can go both ways - once we confirm idea regarding
relation between price level and RMT price, we can backwards approximate
price level from RMT price. Though we cannot suppose that there is some
one-way causality between those; for sure the link P ⇒ RMTP is given by
farmer productivity. However, if (as we argue) RMT has significant effect on
WoW economy of yet unknown direction, then it could backwards affect its
price level. In short - these two variables are tightly linked together. Although
they might be both endogenous and mutually affect each other, it is their close
co-dependence which will be most useful in further analysis.
3.1 Quantity theory of money revisited
So, what should be overall effect of RMT on WoW economy? Before we start
with empirics, we should check what theory implies. Again, our price formation
predictions will be based on quantity theory of money, for the same reasons like
in previous chapter. The fact itself, that some of players are farmers, and that
they collect fees outside of the game does not collide with any of our earlier
arguments. Transfers of Gold alone do not tap any sources nor sinks - so why
should they affect G/g and equilibrium price? But this is not whole picture.
We need to be aware, that Gold farming can induce behavioral changes at
significant number of players, so it can can seriously affect whole economy. To
formulate it in our earlier terms: RMT causes change of population distribution.
Consequently player preference regarding G/g production ratio gets somehow
skewed. For long run equilibrium price level this implies nothing else, that it
might change (in both directions) when RMT activity increases.
So, how does population with farmers differ in play style from one without
them? This question obviously does not regard only Gold sellers, but also its
buyers 30 - who might also behave differently than average player (group 2 =
not-buyer,not-seller). Now we will examine activity of both, and try to argue in
what direction and time frame they might affect G/g ratio of Gold and goods
in economy - which according to QTM determines price level.
Gold farmers typically do not tap wide variety of Gold sources nor sinks.
Their production regime consists mainly of looting and gathering - which, as we
know, brings into economy both Gold and goods at ratio defined by Blizzard.
Such ratio can slightly differ, by concrete type of activity, however no serious
deviation from other population G/g can be expected here. More important is
what the farmers don’t do - they probably do not do much quests (⇒ G ↘),
they do not excessively consume goods to gain advantage against other players
(⇒ g ↗), they do not level - since they are already on level 80 (⇒ G↘) and for
sure they do not spontaneously consume (⇒ G ↗), or engage in PvP (player
vs. player) combat - which brings only repair costs (⇒ G ↗). Possibly most
significant effect might have their AH activity. They sell largest deal of their
production on AH and possibly also speculate a lot, throwing much Gold into
30These are groups 1 and 3 from previous chapter. Most probably the population of buyers
(group 3) will be larger than one of sellers (group 1), but inversely farmers will be more
economically active. Hence we should suspect that both groups behavior changes are relevant.
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5% tax sink(⇒ G ↘). So, the overall effect of Gold farmers activity on G/g is
rather inconclusive.
The intuition regarding Gold buyers is a little more straightforward. They
don’t farm, but rather play PvP and spend Gold. From previous chapter we
know, they are possibly those with high opportunity costs, so they should try to
save time on behalf of Gold spendings - buying expensive items at AH (instead
of waiting for better price ⇒ G ↘) and using public transport (⇒ G ↘).
Generally they will most probably choose more Gold consuming play style, since
they can afford it once they have open RMT channel of income. These players
will most probably shift G/g ratio towards goods, hence cause deflation.
To sum it up, Gold production may theoretically affect G/g ratio in both
directions, as argued for example here [27]. We might rather support hypothesis
of deflationary long run effect of RMT, but such conclusion would be too weakly
justified. We would need quantitatively analyze usage of sinks and sources to
give better prediction, but data for that are not available. Instead of analyzing
its parts, in following section we will try to directly measure overall effect using
data we have - from RMT market. Before we do that, we should also give reader
few ideas about adjustment process whose speed shall play important role in
further analysis, as we need to know how seriously lagged variables to introduce
in our regressions.
Adjustment process Short run analysis of RMT effects is perhaps even more
complex than long run, we present only a simple suggestion how it might go.
Supposing that farmers have some Gold reserves (which are for security reasons
not large, as we argued earlier), we will consider those as outside of economy -
because they don’t circulate, hence they don’t affect prices through QTM. When
some positive RMT demand shock occurs, these reserves diminish - they are sold
to players, released into economy (G↗). Within following hours or days farmers
increase their activity temporarily to replenish stock, or permanently - if the
demand shock is permanent. What does this imply for price level? In short run
after an inflow of G we should observe increase in P . But this effect is reversed
in medium run - as farmers again move similar amount of G from economy to
their stock. Before that happens, high price level causes more Gold to be washed
in sinks (see self-regulatory mechanisms in previous chapter), so when farmers
get to original reserve stock of Gold, G is already below original level - which
implies deflation. With deflated prices, Gold farmers find it harder to produce
further gold and RMTP moves up. So does the RMT demand for deflated
(hence more valuable) Gold - so direction of change in RMTQ is inconclusive -
and so is the second shift in price level. Changed price level again through same
channels affects both RMT supply and demand, and vice versa. Because we did
not observe RMTP seriously oscillating, we suppose that finally equilibrating
mechanisms start to work, RMTP and P move back to old equilibrium (or to
new one, if original demand shock was permanent).
We should observe the first part of process within hours or days - we saw
that internal WoW markets adjust very quickly. Yet the horizon in latter part
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is more unclear - it depends on length of Gold supply chain (how long it takes
before change in price level manifests in RMT supply price), and response of
RMT demand (how quickly do players realize that price level changed, and
adjust their Gold demand). Anyway, from above it is perhaps reasonable to
suppose, that any adjustment of WoW economy should take no longer than few
months, so that even in our relatively short datasets (daily, from 1 month to
1 year length) it seems legitimate to look for signs of equilibrium. In general
- once we will have rough idea regarding speed of above described convergence
we will abandon analyzing this complex phenomenon and focus on long run
equilibrium, for which only the G/g ratio matters.
3.2 Two puzzles
Provided that increasing population of farmers shifts G/g ratio, thus also the
equilibrium, we have an additional interpretation for distribution of equilibrium
price levels among various realms, that we saw earlier: the price level could
indicate how serious is Gold farming on given realm. Before we start to look
more rigorously for scale, and more importantly even direction of such RMT
effect, let me present two stylized facts, or say puzzles, which we will try to
answer in this chapter:
Emerald Dream puzzle When we look again at figure 1 and table 2.2, we
see that even though our data passed normality tests, there is one realm with
considerably lower price level - Emerald Dream. Its deviation can of course be
result of random effect, or the population preference may simply imply different
G/g equilibrium. However this realm has reputation of being heavily leveraged
by Gold farmers [29]. This is also confirmed by our Swagvault data, which
reports second largest sales on Emerald Dream. Then also, perhaps not surpris-
ingly, Emerald Dream has highest average RMT price reported by Swagvault -
which by the way supports our Theorem 3.1.
Such observation is puzzling - especially when we compare them to Blizzard’s
claim [21] or other sources [12] stating that Gold farming causes inflation. Our
“evidence” suggests quite the opposite. On the other hand, there is no discussion
about fact, that last years saw rise of Gold farming, and many players report
that prior to our relatively short observation WoW realms really experienced
long ongoing inflation - which rather seems to support Blizzard’s statement. So,
what is the real cause of inflation in WoW?
Swagvault puzzle In one of my early RMT market examinations I tried to
estimate RMT demand elasticity by following regression. Idea was simple -
Gold suppliers bear almost all costs in yuan. So, when we consider increase
in CNY/EUR exchange rate, in our simple yuan denominated RMT market
model, supply should not shift as production costs in yuan still remain same.
Yuan denominated demand should move upwards, because European buyers
are suddenly endowed with larger purchasing power. Then the quantities sold
should increase as well. However, my results were quite opposite:
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RMTQT,R = α+ αR + β1FXT + β2Patch (8)
RMTQT,R is quantity sold by Swagvault company at time T on realm R, FXT
is spot CNY/EUR rate and rest are usual dummies for specific servers and game
patches.
Parameter αR FX Patch
Coefficient -4000 to 16000 -6000 -1100
P-value 7 of 15 significant 0 0.01
N 1097
Adjusted R2 0.64
We see that volume of Gold sold actually declines with strengthening euro
- which is quite strange. For that we may think of two possible explanations.
First, there is inferior goods hypothesis, that European consumers endowed by
larger purchasing power decided to buy less Gold. However such explanation
seems highly unlikely - there is no economic reason for supposing that Gold
is inferior. But when sticking to our hypothesis of flat supply curve and very
natural assumption of downward sloping demand that shifts right with increased
endowment, we are left with only other explanation - that even though demand
shifts right as we supposed, supply also shifts - upwards, to more than offset
shift of demand in terms of quantity sold.
Only reasonable explanation of such movement might be found in Theo-
rem 3.1: increase of in-game price level. But through what channel does in-
crease in demand change price to such high degree?31 So, neither the second of
our alternative explanations seems much plausible - it would require the FX to
have very strong leverage on in-game price level.
Figure 3: Gold as inferior goods Figure 4: Price level shift
31-6000 parameter means, that on average server with daily 30.000 Gold sales fall of volume
by 20%, in response to 10% FX shift. Because farmer’s productivity is almost linear function
of price level, the price level would need to shift by more than 20% supposing that RMT
demand is unit elastic.
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3.3 Effect of FX
The trouble with RMT market analysis is endogenity of practically all variables
we can observe. Like we saw in Swagvault puzzle - we cannot deny possibility,
that endogenity of supply curve completely reversed effect, we were looking for.
This is the reason, why this work heavily relies on FX changes, which are clearly
exogenous32, but possibly very relevant for WoW economy. So, before we shall
examine RMT market in closer detail, it might be useful to run simple regression
showing how FX and in-game price level are related. Even though this will not
tell us much about actual working of RMT market, we will at least get result
unflawed by possible endogenity, telling us roughly what the demand shock on
RMT market does to WoW economy.
APIT,R = α+αR+β1FXT+β2FXT−7+β3FXT−30+β4FXT−60+β5Patch (9)
APIT,R is average price index at time T on realm R, FXT is spot CNY/EUR
rate and rest are usual dummies for specific servers and game patches.
Parameter αR FXT FXT−7 FXT−30 FXT−60 Patch
Coefficient -0.3 to 0.08 -0.007 -0.18 0.16 -0.1 -0.23
P-value 9 of 10 0.92 0.002 0 0.08 0
significant
N 330
Adjusted R2 0.76
First thing we look for here, is the long run effect of FX change (sum of all
FX parameters) on price level API, that results in −0.13. This is good result -
it shows us that appreciation of EUR actually causes deflation in WoW. When
re-considering Swagvault puzzle, this indicates that price level shift explanation
might be the right one. Also the numerical result is quite close - in our rough
footnote computation we were suggesting that -0.2 shift would be needed, which
was merely an approximation based on (unproven) unit elasticity assumption.
It is natural to suspect that parameters of highly correlated FX lagged vari-
ables might show false significance by jointly fitting on some random fluctuation,
and canceling out in long run - which could seriously distort resulting image of
both adjustment process directions and scale (however they should not much
change the overall effect). In many slightly altered regressions, we really ob-
served such parameter behavior, and reported one of more conservative results.
But still, the scale of each single parameter should be taken just as approxi-
mation. Surprisingly reliable was the stability of signs of parameters - showing
repetitively pattern of sharp decline in FXT or FXT−7, rebounce in FXT−14 or
FXT−30 and small but very significant fall in FXT−60. This was the case even
if we omitted one or more parameters, to prevent the mentioned joint fitting.
32Not even author is optimistic enough to suppose, that economy of virtual worlds might
affect some real exchange rate.
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Result presented above is kind of median representative of many models
tried - after all we used 60 days long time frame of FX to explain observations
of price levels over 33 days, which is far from ideal. However during regressions
it showed up, that 60 days long frame really is needed - results using shorter
FX data were even less stable, with aggregate effects moving between API
(and also MPI) -0.5 and 0.1. Such high variance was most likely caused by
capturing different stages of adjustment process. So we can conclude, that 60
days is perhaps reasonable scope for examining adjustment of WoW economy -
but we would possibly need longer price level data to confirm.
RMT market Luckily we managed to obtain such data - using two panels
from own 2009 measurement and 2008 data that was kindly provided by Gold-
buster - German RMT company, we managed to get long time series of daily
average RMT market prices. From proposition 3.1, we know that there should
be negative nearly linear link between WoW price level and RMT prices. So, us-
ing our RMT data, we can possibly cross-check above result, regarding relation
between FX and API, running very similar regression:
RMTPT = α+β1FXT+β2FXT−7+β3FXT−30+β4FXT−60+β5Patch1+β6Patch2+β7Patch3+β8Patch4
(10)
RMTPT,R is average price of Gold at time T denominated in yuan. FXT
is spot CNY/EUR rate. Then there are four dummies controlling for patches
(they are zero prior to patch and one after patch). These patches are 3.0.2,
Wrath of The Lich King expansion, 3.0.9 (jointly with 3.0.8 - these two came in
20 days, so their adjustment processes probably merged together), and 3.1.0.33
Parameter FXT FXT−7 FXT−30 FXT−60 P1 P2 P3 P4
Coefficient -0.4 14.1 -24 23 33 -15 -39 -2
P-value 0.9 0.004 0 0 0 0 0 0.6
N 213
Adjusted R2 0.83
Again - first we check long run effect of FX rate shift, which is 12.7. In late
April 2009 (middle time of our Price level observations) mean yuan price of Gold
was about 90, so the estimated effect of unit euro appreciation accounts for 14.1
% increase in RMT prices. Through proposition 3.1 this confirms both sign and
size of our earlier estimation of long run FX effect of in-game price level (and
reversedly also serves as strong support for proposition itself). When looking
at both long run effects of FX (14.1% on RMTP and -13% on API), we may
further extend proposition 3.1 by setting an approximative rule of thumb that
ceteris paribus (when worker wage and game mechanics dont change), there is
negative linear relation between those two:
33We controlled only for patches that are claimed to be major. For all patch details and
release dates see [?].
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∆log(API) ∼= −∆log(RMTP ) (11)
Also the single parameters seem quite consistent with time pattern we saw in
API price level index adjustment. There after hypothetic appreciation of euro
we saw a short run downward spike, which was almost offset in 30 day horizon,
then finally in 60 days price level moved to new, slightly lower equilibrium. Our
theory implies, that RMT prices (reflecting production costs) should after initial
shock caused by shift of demand move with slight lag behind API this trend
in inverse direction suggested by our new rule of thumb. This is what we may
actually see in data - after initial spike (caused possibly by both initial demand
shock, and consequent deflation), RMTP adjusts to new equilibrium. Here the
most significant portion of adjustment takes place in last 30 days, which was not
completely the case of API. The possibility of longer RMT market adjustment
was already suggested in 3.1.
What our theory did not fully predict is the temporary decrease of RMT
price below initial level (although we did not see similar behavior of price level,
which our rule of thumb would require). The most apparent possible explana-
tion is, that we have not fully captured API adjustment pattern by our sparse
(0-7-30-60) set of lagged variables34. There could also be numerous other ex-
planations regarding sloped short-run supply curve, buyers and sellers adjusting
money reserves after deflationary spike, and notably also our short-run RMTQ
indeterminacy caused by endogenity of both RMT supply and demand. We
will not examine those, as details of adjustment process are out of scope of this
work.
3.4 Causes of inflation
In previous section we have shown that WoW price level is heavily leveraged
through RMT market. There are four exogenous factors determining RMT mar-
ket and consequently equilibrium of in-game price: player preference (⇒ RMT
demand), CNY/EUR exchange rate (⇒ RMT demand), Chinese worker costs
(⇒ RMT supply), and game mechanics (⇒ both supply and demand). Appar-
ently player preference is only non-objective of those factors, so it is perhaps
the determinant of different equilibrium price levels across realms.
Answer to Emerald Dream puzzle In the end our answer will only extend
original very general proposition 2.1, stating that differences in long-run equi-
librium price levels are caused by different player preferences. Our extension
will be following: it might be useful to distinguish between preferences related
to game itself (directly affecting price level through G/g ratio), and preferences
related to RMT (namely transaction costs TC determining size of group 3 -
number of Gold buyers). Both of these most probably affect price level, and
34Again this is a problem of short data, we would possibly not do any better with unreliable
results of overspecified model such as (0-7-14-21-30 etc.)
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can cause cross-realm differences. But which of them actually is main cause of
price level dispersion we observed in chapter 2?
Intuitive step to find out what fraction of price level differences would be
regressing RMT sale volumes price level API on RMTQ while controlling for
realm with dummies. Then regression parameter of volume times actual volume
should indicate RMT effect, while server dummy should stand for effect of in-
game preferences. This approach would be plausible, if RMTQ was exogenous.
But since both RMT supply and demand are functions of API, this is certainly
not the case.
There is not even way to use some instruments for RMTQ such as FX,
because we earlier saw, that it affects to API and hence also to RMT supply.
What we can do, is just to provide most intuitive answer on our puzzle: from
studying FX shifts we know, that higher RMT demand ceteris paribus leads to
lower price level and high RMT prices. Then again more as a rule of thumb
than as a law we can propose that Realm with higher average RMT price has
probably higher demand for Gold on RMT market. This says nothing else that
both low price level and high RMT prices at Emerald Dream indicate, that it’s
economy is indeed heavily leveraged by Gold farming activity.
Long run inflation Using development of three objective causes of inflation
mentioned above: Chinese worker costs, CNY/EUR exchange rate, and game
mechanics, we will be much more successful in explaining long run trends jointly
working on all realms. We earlier quoted Blizzard website, claiming that infla-
tion is caused by Gold farmers - but this is far from being true. In fact quite
the opposite might show reasonable - as much of our evidence suggests, Gold
farming itself actually decreases price level.
However, over last eight months (09/2008 - 05/2009) average RMT prices
for 1000 Gold have decreased from 130 yuan to 80 yuan - which by our rule
of thumb implies Gold inflation of 38 % (so our theory confirms that player’s
complaints and Blizzard adressed issues of Gold inflation have solid reason).
How might we explain that? When we look back at our estimate (11) we may
actually use it for explaining such movement.
In the same period CNY/EUR rate has fallen from 10.9 to 8.9, which implies
−2 ∗ 12.7 = −25.4 decrease in RMT price. When we further add up all patch
dummy parameters we get another −23 shift. Together this results in RMT
price shift of 48.4, that is by rule of thumb Gold inflation of 37 %, which is
quite close to inflation which we wanted to explain. Such result however has at
least two flaws: firstly we have not accounted for worker wage, supposing that
it did not change significantly over 8 months (if it did, it might have caused bias
of our estimates). Secondly eight months is enough for change of population
preference - or even for change of population structure. But when supposing that
number of Gold buyers increased (which is much more likely than the oposite),
we know that this would actually push the inflation down, so we would only
underestimate effect of FX and patches.
We may therefore conclude that the most possible causes of observed in-
4 ARTIFICIAL SCARCITY 40
flation in World of Warcraft were Blizzard patches and yuan appreciation.
Gold farming played the role in it, however only as a channel through which
CNY/EUR rate changes translated into WoW economy. By itself the Gold
farming actually pushed price level down. The only way how could Gold farm-
ers drive inflation up is by stopping their activity. 35 Hence Blizzard either
makes mistake in its official statement, or more likely it willingly promotes it’s
anti-RMT policy by accusing farmers of causing inflation (one half of which is
by irony caused by patches from Blizzard itself).
4 Artificial scarcity
In previous chapters we saw, that 3 of 4 patches issued by Blizzard caused
inflation of Gold. Also we saw that prior to patch, price indices spiked up -
possibly because of inflationary expectations of players (caused by experience
from previous patches). From these two observations we will induce conclusion
that Blizzard patches generally do cause inflation. What is the motivation for
such behavior - for destabilizing own economy? In this chapter we will present
a microeconomic model, which tries to explain such behavior of inflating own
currency - or rather of deflate costs of all its other products - virtual goods).
Before we get to the model, there is one more thing to be made clear - what
does really happen during these inflationary patches? Importantly, the G/g
production ratio does not change much, and if it does it is not major source
of inflation - we will assume it does not. What patches basically do is, that
they extend the high boundaries of productivity. This happens for instance by
introducing new, stronger items, or even more fundamentally by increasing the
level cap. With that new equipment or higher level, characters naturally become
more productive - in one hour, they are able to gather more resources and loot
more monsters - so that both more goods and Gold enter the economy. So far
we see no inflation, only the economy “grows”.
What happens next is crucial to us - one character needs one weapon, one
shield, one pair of boots etc. When new and better items appear on market,
value of old ones diminishes. Suddenly mote goods is rendered useless, and is
sold to vendors. Notice, that this is not a one-off shock but a permanent trend,
since old items types, which are no more valued at AH, keep appearing during
standard farming. Many similar mechanisms which we won’t mention work in
this direction - core information is that after patch, mean production time of
items decreases, but also more Gold starts appearing in economy. Some items
are sold, Gold stays in circulation - and price level in Gold increases.
How is it with price level in yuan? For convenience we recall our earlier
pricing equation determining absolute price of goods in yuan:
P (G) =
1
0.95
∑
i∈I
ti(Cs + Co) +  (12)
35This is further supported by known fact, that when Blizzard bans larger number of Gold
farmer accounts at once (because of anti-RMT policy), prices most typically spike up.
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We know that ti decreased, other factors did not change - after patch,
yuan denominated costs actually decrease (offsetting inflation, as we know from
our rule of thumb). So even though we earlier saw and discussed inflationary
patches, we actually see they are inflationary only in terms of increased Gold
availability, but through decrease in ti they actually increase availability of items
(through both own farming or RMT purchase) too.
4.1 Blizzard’s profit
We can simplify our view on WoW economy to a market, where virtual goods
are sold to players for real cash. To realize this we should examine the Cs term
from our pricing equation. The time spent in game is in some sense costly. With
given monthly playtime, player pays for each hour appropriate part of it - to
Blizzard. Since part of the playtime players spend by obtaining needed items
or Gold, we may say that they in fact purchase them from Blizzard for costs of
ti ∗Cs (plus they bear the opportunity costs, which are now out of our interest).
The fact that players pay fixed monthly subscription and not for actual playtime
only obscures fact, that for producing an item each player pays some small fee
to Blizzard. That fee is of course variable - if the production time of item is for
simplicity an hour, and player plays WoW T hours a month, then fee he pays
for producing each item is Cs/T .
Now, what happens, when RMT farmers come into game? Their playtime
TF is supposedly very high, so that fees which Blizzard receives from them
Cs/TF per produced item are lower - which should not matter, as they pro-
duce more items. However, they do not consume those items, they cheaply sell
them through AH to other players - who otherwise would have produced them
themselves. So how does actually Blizzard lose money through this channel?
Thanks to farmers, players can faster level-up, get more easily to some desired
game achievements etc., so in the end they actually cease playing (and paying
subscriptions) after shorter period of time. However elaborate and synthetic
our model may seem, it well reflects at least this dimension of gaming, and ac-
tually justifies why Blizzard should struggle to reduce Gold farming - in order
to sustain own profits. We will return to this later.
More importantly this approach of Blizzard “selling” virtual goods will help
us to explain its motivation for issuing inflationary patches, using an microeco-
nomic model. Before we do that, we need to realize one key fact about virtual
goods - the relative nature of its utility.
..but the satisfaction of that [gaming] experience can be significantly lessened
if one observes that other players, who ought to be poor like oneself, are instead
very well arrayed in expensive equipment that they bought for hundreds of dollars
outside the game[3]
The game of WoW (and many other virtual worlds) is in fact a sort of red
queen race. The purpose of most important items which player needs, is to
outperform other players. Intuitively - if all players get better swords, no one
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of them is better of when they start fighting against each other.36 To put it in
more economic terms, each good creates a negative network externality. The
utility from a sword heavily relies on what other swords are out there.
A reader who is not familiar with virtual economies should rather imagine
markets with fashion products, or high-tech consumer electronics, or perhaps
even money. Great deal of their utility lays in fact that they are scarce. Even
though marginal production costs of those goods is close to zero, the demand for
them is largely driven by the fact itself, that they are scarce. This is typically
caused by decision of their manufacturer, who maximizes profit by somehow
adjusting price of his product to keep network effect low. Further on we will
call such behavior an inducing artificial scarcity - which means, that monopoly
producer of a good willingly keeps it price high perhaps even above standard
monopoly price, in order to maximize long-run profit while taking into account
the negative network effect.
4.2 Defining the problem
It is not unique to virtual economies, that some producers can create goods with
positive value 37 at zero marginal costs. After covering initial investment, they
could possibly flood the economy with their products at price close to zero, how-
ever they don’t do so. Since their markets are always in some sense monopolies,
they maximize revenues by keeping price high, like in classical microeconomic
examples.
Under certain circumstances, a monopolistic producer of good may find op-
timal to create what we call Artificial scarcity of goods, that is to deliberately
reduce amount of goods sold way below presumable short run competitive or
even monopoly optimum. Such behavior may seem irrational, but as we will see
later, it only just follows from little bit more sophisticated approach.
Now we will propose simple microeconomic model, to illustrate motivation
for such behavior. As I believe, it may provide some insight in analysis of other
markets, however there seems to be no clearer example of such market setting,
than virtual goods markets.
There are two very distinctive assumptions in the model – we already men-
tioned zero marginal costs of production, but the second one is slightly more
complicated. First we will denote stock of goods present in economy as St. That
is goods, which has already been sold and is being consumed in period t.
St =
t−1∑
j=0
Qj .d
t−j where 0 < d ≤ 1
36Similar, but slightly more complicated is the need of equipment for activities where players
fight together against game environment. It is because their utility here still derives from how
well do they do compared to other teammates.
37That means there exists at least someone willing to pay for the goods.
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Here Qj stands for amount of goods sold in period j, and d for durability of
goods. Each period, fraction 1− d of goods is destroyed. Apparently for d = 0
all goods are destroyed immediately after consumption, conversely for d = 1 the
good is perfectly durable, and each piece of it can be used indefinitely. As we
will see further on, latter is not as academic case as it may seem, and will have
some implications for our subject of study.
We further on assume that market with our good emerged just in period 0,
and is running till presence – that is till period t and further on. There was no
initial stock of goods, that is S0 = 0. For quickly emerging (and deteriorating)
markets which we study this assumption of given starting point is quite realistic.
Now we can move on to our second core assumption, which states that de-
mand shifts over time based on quantities sold in previous periods, and also
autonomously deteriorates.
Dt = A−Bp− Et− St
The somewhat strange St component has its roots in theory of relative utility.
Consumers do perceive their utility relatively to other agents, and the amounts
of good they consume. The more widespread is consumption of certain good the
less individual utility it provides. It follows that consumers adjust their demand
according to stock of goods present in economy.
It is a very natural property of network effect, that transfer of information
across network is subject to some friction. Here the demand reacts to stock
changes with one period lag. This follows from concept of bounded rationality –
the individual makes his demand decisions on the spot, but amount bought (and
consumed) by others is seen with delay. This delay is caused by decentralized
nature of such information, preventing consumer from fully assessing own utility
obtained from potential purchase.
With given demand and production functions 38 we may move on to pro-
ducer profit maximization problem. Now we will specify the model again more
precisely and try to obtain some form of solution.
4.3 Algebraical solution
First, we may define demand (hence quantity sold) as
Dt = A−Bpt − Et− St,
38Production costs we simplify to zero no matter what quantity is produced. In our model
we neglect initial costs as sunk, which means that they mattered in question of entering
market, but not in price decision making, which is our main interest.
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where
St =
t−1∑
j=0
Qjd
t−j ,
and
A,B,E > 0, S0 = 0, 1 ≥ d > 0, Qt = max{0, Dt} ∀t.
Now we can define the producer optimization problem as maximizing total
profit Π over all periods (assuming zero interest rate for simplicity).
Π =
∞∑
t=0
Qtpt =
∞∑
t=0
Qt.
−Qt +A− Et− St
B
Here p(Qt) was easily derived from demand equation. Now we differentiate
to obtain first order conditions, which we will use for examining properties of
solution (which is some sequence {Qt}∞0 maximizing producers profit).
∂Π
∂Qt
=
1
B
[−2Qt +A− Et− St −
∞∑
j=t+1
Qjd
j−t] = 0 ∀t ∈ N0,
which can be further simplified as
Qt = A− Et−
∞∑
j=0
Qjd
|j−t| ∀t ∈ N0.
Now, using assumption E > 0, it can be easily shown from demand equation,
that for each optimal solution ∃k ∈ N0 ∀t > k : Qt = 0. Furthermore we may
choose such k that ∀t, 0 ≤ t ≤ k, Qt > 0
By assumption used above, we in fact only eliminate (for us yet not so inter-
esting) possibility of E = 0, that would bring us closest to standard monopoly
model. It results in some infinite horizon optimization which would be compli-
cated and completely unrelated to dynamic (and short-lived) markets, we are
trying to analyze.
Now our model degenerates into set of k linear equations with k unknowns,
which is still difficult to solve39, but algorithmical solution exists. We however
39Main difficulty lays in fact, that although we know that k exists, it is still unknown. After
it is found, the easy linear algebra results in unique solution {Qt}k0 . In special cases it may
also result in no solution, or infinite set of solutions. Possibly it can be shown that under our
conditions this may never happen, however this is beyond authors mathematical skills - and
beyond scope of our interest, as such case would probably have no economic relevance.
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don’t need to obtain exact solution, in order to derive some economic implica-
tions.
The first important finding is the existence of such solution itself. Optimal
behavior of producer is a finite number of steps in which he sells finite stock of
goods. Then he exits the market since demand becomes zero or negative. By
plugging our results into demand equation we can derive our desired conclusion
about producers price setting behavior.
We will now plug our result
Qt = A− Et−
k∑
j=0
Qjd
|j−t| ∀t ≤ k,
into demand equation for Dt, since we know that Qt > 0 hence Qt = Dt.
Now from
A− Et−
k∑
j=0
Qjd
|j−t| = A−Bpt − Et− St,
we derive surprisingly simple equation
pt =
k∑
j=t
Qjd
j−t
B
.
In case that we employ our optional d = 1 assumption, we get
pt =
k∑
j=t
Qj
B
.
We can now compare our result for p0 with plain monopoly price, which the
same producer would have chosen, if he did not regard future demand develop-
ment. This is standard microeconomic outcome, computed as follows:
Π = (A−Bp)p
∂Π
∂p
= A− 2Bp = 0
pplain =
A
2B
,Qplain =
A
2
Now we shall compare this outcome with our results. From the first order
conditions we know, that
Q0 = A−
k∑
t=0
Qt,
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from which it follows that if k > 0, then
Q0 < Qplain and consequently p0 > pplain.
4.4 Model implications
Our result is in fact quite intuitive. Producer takes into account, that by supply-
ing product to market he undercuts his own future demand. Hence he tends to
reduce sold quantities (= to overshoot prices), compared to classical monopoly
benchmark. The main message of this example is, that such behavior follows
from relative utility driven demand. Even though a good has zero marginal cost
of production, seller releases it deliberately at very low quantities, in order to
make this costless good artificially scarce. Scarce good is from consumers point
of view very valuable and he is willing to pay high prices for it.
From final equation for pt with d = 1 we see, how producer gradually reduces
prices. The stock of goods in economy builds up, and the good looses its value
from consumers point of view. This would in fact happen even in case when
we released our assumption and set E = 0, however it follows from the first
order conditions, that producer would reduce price at infinitely small steps. 40
Such outcome would possibly be eliminated by introducing interest rate, and
discounting of future incomes into model. The possible outcomes can be seen
from figures Figure 7 and Figure 8, where behavior of producer under different
time horizons E is demonstrated.
Artificial scarcity and WoW Now we will examine the link between Ar-
tificial scarcity model and our main topic - WoW. Not to be misunderstood -
purpose of this quite general model was not to sufficiently describe actual work-
ing of virtual goods market in WoW. Goal here was only to point out a pattern
according to which profit maximizing monopoly producer of good with negative
network effect should behave. Introduction of this chapter should then be rather
viewed as defense of my position, that Blizzard actually is such producer, than
a good model for describing its actual market. The artificial scarcity model is
perhaps general enough to give us idea also about behavior of other companies
running virtual worlds - which may differ in many details, however key fact
of monopoly producer selling virtual goods is perhaps common to all of them.
Before we will move on to more general implications of our model, we should
first examine more closely what does the model say about WoW.
The empirics are in accordance with model - since launching WoW in 2004,
Blizzard released two major expansions, which both increased maximum level
40In fact, in such case our discrete model proposed above would collapse, and such solution
would not be easily obtainable. However the economic intuition is clear - once the seller
does not have to bother with autonomously diminishing demand, he slowly exploits maximal
profit. Graphically represented, such profit would cover all the surface under initial demand
curve just like in microeconomic model of perfect discrimination. Once E > 0 imposes time
limit, seller hurries to capture autonomously diminishing demand, so he makes smaller profit,
however in finite time.
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and introduced new items, and we also saw that minor patches might have
similar nature. By changing the game in such manner, the price of older items
went down (in yuan, or time required for obtaining, not necessarily in Gold).
With characters at higher levels, those items could be obtained more easily, so
they became available to poorer players41. Newly introduced stronger items
then took their place of luxury goods available only to top 10 % of players who
could afford it - regardless whether through high in-game effort or RMT.
One could argue, that demand for old items fell mainly because new and
better items got introduced - that is because of the patch and not the network
effect, however this is not fully true. The demand for them would slowly fall
anyway - either because taste of players for new experience (leading to player
outflow from game, in terms of model E > 0), or because of market saturation
(virtual equipment gets never destroyed, hence d = 1). By issuing an expan-
sion Blizzard in fact both creates new monopoly markets, and performs price
reduction strategy on old ones, in accordance with our model.
Evidently, game owners are dictators whose benevolence depends only on the
constraint that they must remain profitable. This power structure has predictable
effects. In every game currently on the market, the owners consider it their right
to introduce changes to game mechanics at any time, without prior consultation
with the players. As a result, avatars [=players] can have their real market value
destroyed overnight, without warning.[3]
Up till now, we have considered producers of virtual goods to be monopo-
lists. Although such view is valid (since no one else has control over production
of WoW Gold), it might perhaps be useful to broaden our view for a while.
We have already touched the issue above, when discussing parameter E > 0.
There are more virtual worlds out there, and they should be seen as imperfect
substitutes. Even though “migration” from one virtual world to other has seri-
ous costs in form of losing all virtual assets (which often needs not to be that
painful, as previous paragraph suggests), achievements of given character and
sometimes also need to purchase software license of other virtual world’s client,
such migration of players between various games is quite common phenomenon
(and also most fertile ground for sociological studies).
In our model, producer sees the threat of losing players (hence consumers
of virtual goods), which manifests in value E that corresponds to his subjective
estimate regarding how long will it take, before all players will spontaneously
migrate elsewhere. If this subjective perspective changes, producer consequently
adjusts his pricing policy. Most typically operators of virtual world, which start
losing population, tend to accelerate inflation (increase availability of virtual
goods) - to maximize profit over shorter time frame than previously expected.
In contrast with that, we may study opposite case - that some producer of
goods with negative network effect may see that there is potential for sustaining
demand for it in long run. In my further research I plan to make further use
of artificial the model by showing that when E = 0 and d < 1, the producer’s
41By poorer we mean poverty in terms of Gold. However reader can easily realize RMT link
to player’s real world wealth.
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optimization gets an infinite horizon, he actually might end up in not inflating
own product. That means to keep the stock of goods in economy constant by
selling Qt = St(1− d) each period. To put it in words: if an operator of virtual
economy got more confidence that he is going to sustain demand for his virtual
goods and/or virtual currency, he might have an economic incentive to keep its
price constant.
4.5 From goods to currencies
In next chapter we shall try to expand one of most interesting consequences of
possible sustainability of virtual economy. It lays in fact that currency of such
economy may have potential to become real currency - in a sense that it could
be used as storage of value, unit of account and means of payment - possibly
even for real goods or services. From this starting point reader should be aware,
that such discussion might not be that academic as it looks. Later on we will
lay some evidence, that even today we already observe some small signs of such
use of some virtual currencies (other than WoW Gold).
Although it may not seem so, this is no serious deviation from our topic.
We deliberately studied in details markets for virtual goods and inflation of
Gold, to get a solid ground for inducing more general theory about its value
and sustainability. We shall use much of above, since it is not possible to study
potential of virtual currency without having some knowledge of markets where
it is primarily used - virtual economies.
We have already mentioned, that artificial scarcity model in some sense
describes not only position of producer of virtual goods, but also of private
currency issuer who is in surprisingly similar situation; the exchange value of
his currency is very sensitive to its amount previously released into circulation,
and more importantly - the his motivation to inflate is very much given by his
expectations regarding future demand for his goods (currency).
Whether keeping the commitment [of price stability] in later periods is profit
maximizing depends on the relation between the expected costs and revenue of
inflating in each period. (...) It depends on his [issuer’s] subjective discount
rate, the real demand for the currency in each period, as well as the time issuer
plans to stay in business.[9]
In this chapter I have perhaps been using a bit confusing terminology - first
we saw “inflationary” patches, which actually caused decrease of some virtual
items costs. We also spoke of inflating producer, who in fact only gradually
reduced price42 of produced good over time - which is hardly an inflation from
any conventional point of view. Now is hopefully a little more clear what was
meant - that by increasing volume of such good in economy, producer decreased
its utility - through negative network effect. This then caused what inflation
actually is - that exchange value of that particular good (or money) went down.
Now, when we will focus our view on currencies, the inflationary terminology
will become more natural. For simplicity we shall further on assume that (unlike
42In WoW this price reduction wend through reducing farmer’s mean production time of
an item.
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in WoW, where the inflationary process is of more hidden nature), the inflating
behavior of virtual goods producer has purely monetary form. This means, that
he maintains game mechanics, and fixed nominal costs in game, but he makes
currency more easily available, which manifests in better affordability of other
virtual goods he sells. Note that this also is the kind of behavior which we
described by Artificial scarcity model, and that in real consequences it does not
much differ from WoW patches we examined. 43
43Cause of such inflation would be perhaps only be more apparent to players and might
cause their unwanted migration.
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5 Virtual currencies
In this theoretical chapter we will almost completely abandon case of WoW
virtual economy, and will try to discuss general issue of virtual currencies -
and their capability of overlapping into real economy. The argumentation
is mainly based on Karl Menger’s article Money[10], so let me first briefly
sketch the parts which will be of our interest, namely those which regard
the emergence of money. His analysis begins with movement from barter to
money economy, further continues by describing competition between various
forms of payment, and ends with usage of precious metal coins. The money
is depicted as social institution; although physical characteristics of currencies
(slaves,cattle,metals,tobacco) change over time, their one property is crucial: to
accept them, individual needs to expect that they will be further accepted by
others. That is, what makes money a social phenomenon, and that is why it’s
evolution is so complex.
As Menger stresses, specific goods may function as money only in certain
strata of country’s population and even for certain transactions only [conjunc-
tions removed]. In his view, on the very beginning of evolution of new currency
there is just few individuals who find it convenient(or directly profitable) to use
some commodity as means of payment. Only if the benefits of new payment
method are strong enough to overpower Nash equilibrium of old currency, the
social institution of new currency may arise. Consequently, only if advantages
of this new currency are able to attract increasing mass of population, then it
becomes money in sense of generally accepted means of payment. 44 For a com-
modity to become a currency, the most solid starting point is a large and stable
market for its non-monetary use. Then, if it’s other properties are convenient
45, it might gradually get accepted as means of payment in wider and wider
parts of society, becoming generally used currency in the end.
Case of currency which has no inherent value (such as paper money) Menger
treats only marginally, with general notion that such money must be either be
redeemable for valuable commodity, or legally enforced. Thus we may think, his
theory is of no major value, for today’s reality. However, even though there are
no direct implications, it is Menger’s method and general view on evolution of
money, which leaves his work unsurpassed for our purposes till today. 46 Neo-
44Reader needs not to confuse himself with definitions of money. The question of when some
good becomes money is of little interest to us. Menger briefly answers it as follows: Com-
modities that have become generally used intermediaries of exchange, if only within certain
geographical boundaries, and possibly even within certain segments of population or territory,
are called money in scientific usage. In further text we will stick to this broad definition,
which is suitable for evolutionary view on money, and which probably causes least confusion.
Just note, that the term ’territory’ is not to be taken literally, namely it may stand for real
as well for virtual areas of economic activity.
45In ideal case, it is durable, divisible, transportable etc. However, as we know from classical
Yap stones example, at least two of three mentioned properties are not really necessary. It is
its general acceptance in trade, which causes good to become money.
46..and perhaps also the fact, that 20th century was century of national currencies (as em-
phasized for example in [8].), which made the monetary theory swing into different direction.
Although it might seem odd to base analysis of virtual economies on works from 19th century,
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classical concepts focus on steady state equilibria, and fixed institutional setting.
Thus they can hardly be employed for analysis of institutional evolution - which
we see today in electronic payment systems.[10] Of course, there are difficulties
to capture evolution of institutions in any model. In particular, Schmitz sees
the most disturbing simplification of present theories in the perfect rationality
of agents. Although Menger’s analysis is frequently quoted in neoclassical pa-
pers 47, his key point is missing - that the acceptability of money stands on how
agents form their expectations. The assumption that agents are endowed with
some form of perfect rationality is simply misleading, certainly when institu-
tional evolution is in question. Only a currency which is individually rational to
accept (without prior knowledge of all other agents preferences) for some frac-
tion of agents, might be successful. Only a small fraction of population initially
learns about different degrees of marketability [=to use money]. This comes from
realistic thought, that under conditions of institutional evolution, the agents are
generally not rational, and their information is not symmetric. [Menger’s] the-
ory is grounded in the behavior of decentralized, self-interested, and modestly
informed individuals.[8] Advantage of Menger’s ’model’ is, that it does not re-
quire any Nash equilibria or collective action, for money to emerge. Notice that,
in Kyotaki and Wright’s model, money can never emerge from barter economy.
[10] Apparently we should stick to Menger’s notion of acceptance, because it
is more useful for explaining actual evolution of money, in realistic world of
decentralized information. Most typical example of such information needed to
accept some commodity based money is a good knowledge of underlying com-
modity market. We are now going to argue, that such commodity might be
virtual goods.
5.1 Virtual commodity money
Each money is in some sense fiat - one accepts it only because own expectation
about future demand of other agents. In case of money type which is tradition-
ally understood as fiat, the statement is obviously true, as the belief that others
will in future accept the money is crucial for its acceptance. However, it is not so
clear that the same holds for commodity redeemable money, where we need to
go just one step further. Because it’s acceptance has one additional cornerstone
- the belief, that even if money will not be demanded by other agents in future,
the underlying commodity will be.48 There is common understanding that com-
modity backed money is of more solid and reliable nature. Apparently this is
true only as much as solid and reliable is the demand for underlying commodity.
To put this in other words, when deciding about acceptance of money, agent
considers his chances to get some value back in future. When we set aside trans-
action costs, he is indifferent between getting it back through direct exchange
there is probably none more insightful theory available.
47For example the most of well known Kyotaki and Wright’s model[7] is just formalization
of Menger’s ideas.
48We intentionally omit the marginal case, when agent accepts money and intends to con-
sume underlying commodity, which is equivalent to directly buying commodity itself.
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of money, or through redeeming money and selling the underlying commodity.
Hence, although there are two forms of demand for commodity money (for its
pecuniary and non-pecuniary use), only thing that matters to him in the end is
an aggregate of both. When, in contrary, he considers whether to accept pure
fiat money, there is only pecuniary type of demand to consider. Once we realize
this, we know that we have no clue for a priori saying which type of money
is better i.e. demand for which should be more stable. This is most possibly
the reason why currently established currencies (which are fiat) should gener-
ally outperform any privately issued currency - even if it was redeemable for a
commodity. The demand for pecuniary use of established fiat money is more
reliable, than aggregate of both demand types for any newly issued commodity
redeemable money. At least here Kyotaki and Wright do make a very relevant
point. In most countries, current situation with one national currency in use
is kind of Nash equilibrium. One would need to have serious incentive (such
as hyperinflation) to start using other means of payment for real transactions,
than official currency. Let me stress, that global occurrence of such incentive is
quite unlikely in modern economies (especially today when there is rather a fear
of deflation imminent). So, even if hyperinflation of some currency occurs, its
users should much more likely switch in favor of other national currency, than
of some new privately issued coin - simply because of higher reliability of its
future demand.
Selgin and White argue that this is the case: The forces of convergence that
drove that evolution [of commodity money] strongly favor an established money
over any would-be alternative.[8] This conclusion follows from thought, that
advantages of already established currencies maintained by agents who are not
profit driven are so prohibitive, that they don’t allow for any new entrants to
the currency market. Establishing new means of payment would according to
them need a co-ordinated public decision, much like a decision to switch the side
of the road on which we will all drive.
Such statements about future direction of evolution are allays a bit tricky.
They generally rely on author’s experience and intuition, and are hard to dispute
until proven wrong. I am certainly not entitled to challenge ideas following
from experience of two renowned scholars on theoretical field. But, later on I
will pose two recent examples, suggesting that no collective action is needed
for establishing new means of payment - at least on some local markets. This
in fact shows, that the hardest point of currency evolution in Mengerian sense
- breaking of Nash equilibria, is not an unbearable obstacle for evolution of
currency, as Selgin and White suggest. In other words, even under todays
conditions of state monetary monopoly, some groups may find using new means
of payment individually rational.
It is perhaps clear to which point we are heading - that virtual economies
might serve as needed starting point for emergent currency. We may view
their currencies as commodity based money, redeemable for virtual goods. By
maintaining VE (without inflationary patches), operator guarantees availability
of non-pecuniary use of currency, but much more importantly - by sustaining
VE player base he also creates reliable demand of currency and enables its
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“redeemability” through RMT.49
The problem here clearly is the reliability of demand for such money. We
already discussed that nature of demand for virtual goods is unstable. We even
proposed model that supposes only finite frame, for which such demand may be
sustained and furthermore shown, that operator of virtual currency has serious
incentive to inflate it. This implies that no agent should be willing accept such
money, if he had possibility to use some real currency.
Only way out of here is possibility of long-term sustainability of VE (in model
it is the E = 0 case), which would break issuers inflationary incentives. Yet this
is an academic case. VE phenomenon is now too young and too quickly evolving,
so that no operator may foresee future of his virtual economy in longer horizon
than a year or two, which practically neglects possibility of non-inflationary
incentives. In contrast with this fact, we will now present some cases of virtual
currencies being used as means of payment in real transactions.
5.2 Real use of Virtual currencies
Above we doubted motivation of agent to accept virtual currency, because of
inflationary incentives of issuer, and instability of demand for it. This certainly
rules out the case of using virtual currency for longer ongoing transactions or
as storage of value. However the horizon at which demand for virtual currency
might significantly evolve is (arguably) say a week. Then there is plenty of
possible transactions which do have shorter span - which do not need a long-run
demand stability, since agent plans to redeem earned virtual currency for real
cash within few hours from transaction. Now, if payment in such transaction
using a virtual currency is more convenient, it might easily become favored
means of payment in some community.
Tencent QQ coin Two years ago, Wall Street Journal published article[31]
about emerging virtual currency in China. The QQ coin issued by Tencent com-
pany, whose original purpose was to serve as exchange medium for its instant
messenger users, but something else happened. Online game sites beyond Ten-
cent started accepting QQ coins as payment. The coins appeal as a safer, more
practical way to conduct small online purchases, because credit cards aren’t yet
commonplace in China. (...) Dozens of third-party trading posts sprouted up
to ease transactions, turning the QQ coin into a kind of parallel currency. It
is immaterial now, that it was possibly lack of credit cards on market, which
enabled such evolution. The point here is, that once some virtual currency has
solid ground of regular users (in case of QQ it was 233 million of regular regis-
tered users of instant messenger), it might be able to fill in a hole on market -
to get accepted beyond borders of its original purpose.
However there is also a black side of liberal dream about free currency. State-
run media reported that some online shoppers began using QQ coins to buy real-
49Now we are getting out of scope of WoW - where there is no guarantee of redeemability
at all. We speak of VE’s where RMT is completely legal and transparent - like in Entropia
universe, or in Second Life which will be discussed later
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world items such as CD’s and makeup. So-called QQ Girls started accepting
the coins as payment for intimate private chats online. Gamblers caught wind,
too, and started using the currency to get around China’s anti-gambling laws,
converting wins in online mahjong and card games back into cash.
During following year People’s Bank of China issued an edict tacitly aimed at
Tencent and its coin[32], effectively shutting down whole QQ business. Without
mentioning QQ coins specifically, the [PBC] statement said that the government
will bar users from trading virtual currency for real money, and ordered sites
to make a distinction between online credits (like QQ coins) and real money
used for e-commerce. The reasons for such steps were probably mixed - liberal
would argue, that it was the central bank fear of competing currency, common
sense rather suggests that prevention of money laundering, and other activities
mentioned above was the case.
Second Life and Linden dollar Second Life was created in 2003 by Linden
Lab, a San Francisco-based technology company. The number of users has soared
from 700,000 last autumn [=2006] to 6.2 million. (...) [it’s currency] Linden
dollars can be freely exchanged for real American dollars. On an average day,
about 750,000 pounds changes hands.[33]
The case of Linden dollar itself would make a topic for a book. It is actually
a virtual currency, that is by far closest to be called real money. The most
apparent reason for that is Lindex, a working market where Linden dollars are
traded for USD at daily volumes mentioned above. The stable exchange value of
Linden dollar, strongly encourages entrepreneur activity in virtual world. The
stability, which can be seen in Figure 6, can largely be explained by regime under
which Linen dollar operates, which up till now it might be seen as managed
float. Operator of SL - Linden Lab has been deliberately maintaining stable
exchange rate by issuing additional dollars, and selling them at Lindex whenever
its market price went up.
But a real test of devotion of Linden Lab to keep its currency stable has not
yet come - we have up till now not seen the case of Linden dollar significantly
depreciating below target exchange rate. As soon as demand for it stops exceed-
ing supply, Linden Labs will be supposed to intervene in favor of own currency
- which will be costly in terms of USD. Up till now they had an easy job, to
manage floating currency and make profit by selling it at the same time. Now,
currency seems to be almost at fixed rate, but Linden Labs does not have any
obligation to sustain it so - which they probably won’t do, if it should not be
profitable in long run. After such hypothetical release of Linden dollar into free
floating regime, its value will also be determined solely by demand for goods
sold in virtual world. It might perhaps keep some of its value and become a
really competitive currency.
However not even Second Life is free of trouble: It is a land of six mil-
lion citizens with no police force, no courts and no taxes. The fast-growing
economy is lightly controlled, and banks and the stock exchange lack even basic
regulation.[33] However this gradually stops being the case, in 2008 Linden Labs
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Figure 5: Lindex historical development - volume[34]
Figure 6: Lindex historical - price[34]
introduced strict policy of bank licensing[35] to prevent further banking frauds,
which was an important next step of strengthening the virtual currency - that
now actually may bring positive and reliable interest, like real currencies do.
Last thing to mention is, that even though I found no record of Linden dollar
being persistently used in real-world transactions, other most interesting events
are reported - that whole real world businesses relocate their activity to Second-
life. Fields like education[37][36], or marketing [38], might tap serious potential
in using virtual environment - and they actually do. This work is no place for
assessing such trials, the point here is that by moving some part of business
into virtual world, entrepreneurs help to stabilize demand for virtual currency -
reinforcing its acceptability in transactions and also giving it potential to really
serve as a storage of value.
5.3 Outlook for virtual currencies
Once a monetary standard has been selected, network effects make that standard
difficult to dislodge without coercion, especially by an imagined money with no
base of current users.[8] In this statement, Selgin and White give us a hint
about how to challenge their conclusion. It is the lack of base of current users,
that makes emergence of new currency impossible. How come? Let’s once
again return to the Menger’s line of thought. Did precious metal money have
base of users, when they started to compete against older, and well established
currencies? No, but precious metals themselves did. And this is exactly the
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point, which Selgin and White (and many others) are possibly missing: the
initial base of users needs not to demand emerging currency for further monetary
use. Once this currency is commodity based (just like golden standard bank
notes), in early stages of evolution it may derive its exchange value primarily
from the value of commodity it represents - regardless if it is gold, or virtual
assets. Once after some individuals start using it purely as a means of payment,
the demand for it further grows making the base even more solid. But this is
already beyond our question of unbearability of initial Nash equilibrium - which
we now consider as solved for commodity-backed currencies. But what about
the second stage - can such currency today attract more users?
We got used to fiat money, and return to commodity money seems unthink-
able. There has been plenty of academic discussion about this topic, and I am
neither going to extend nor to summarize it. Let me just end this chapter by
an open line of thought: Perhaps the most supported argument for implau-
sibility of commodity based money is unstable behavior of market with given
commodity. Evolution of economy and technology may influence both its supply
and demand in unpredictable manner, which poses serious threat to the derived
currency. Now consider nature of virtual goods, with monopoly producer who
strictly defines rules of their production and use. Are they subject of such shocks
as well? If issuer was able to sustain demand for them 50, would they be able
to penetrate much more markets than presently QQ coin or Linden dollar?
Many economists argue that this really can’t happen. Issuing of currency
has the properties of natural monopoly, and once established, the monetary
authorities can “get away” with a great deal of monetary misbehavior before
loss of market to competing currencies poses any significant problem[5]. This
however does not mean, that there cannot emerge new currency which will not
drive traditional ones from their markets, but will be naturally dominate new
ones - like those with virtual goods.
It however still remains open question, whether such markets are sustain-
able. The motivation for deliberate inflating of currency, implicitly depends on
expectations of the issuer. In our case of commodity backed money, the relevant
expectations are those about future development of that commodity’s market.
For our specific topic of virtual worlds, it is needed to broadly address issue,
which we haven’t mentioned much - the profit maximizing behavior of currency
issuer, who is also the monopoly producer of its underlying commodity. Income
duality of such agent poses challenge for further research - profits from inflating
currency and sustaining profits maintaining artificial scarcity of produced com-
modity are clearly not in accordance. Further examining their trade-off might
provide interesting theoretical results.
50Which today is certainly not - but remember that virtual economies experience the very
first decade of their existence. We may well imagine an Blizzard-like issuer, sustaining demand
for virtual currency by continuously updating virtual content (canceling out falling demand for
underlying commodity, which is here because of negative network effect), but without inflating
the currency itself. Such (very hypothetical) issuer would be able to sustain exchange value
of own currency, and hence be able to compete with modern fiat currencies.
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6 Conclusions
The major contribution of this work lays in fact, that it (perhaps as a first work
in this field) analyses virtual economies, especially economy of World of War-
craft, using standard economic and econometric tools. This was made possible
by quite elaborate retrieving of unique dataset, from Real money trade (RMT)
companies and from the inside of WoW economy. Author is far from claiming
that all his findings are correct. Main contribution of this work lays rather in
mapping potentially very fruitful research area of WoW economy, and posing
some hypotheses which - even if only by being proven wrong - should help our
understanding of virtual economies.
The work finds surprisingly high effect of RMT on WoW economy, actu-
ally arguing that it is major cause of changes of in-game price level, which is
even more surprising when we realize that RMT is officially banned in WoW.
Author argues, that serious inflation observed in WoW over last years was pri-
marily caused not by RMT traders (as Blizzard - the company that runs WoW
- argues), but by changes in EUR-CNY exchange rates and by game patches
released by Blizzard itself.
In second, more theoretical part of paper author proposes a model, which
tries to explain motivation of issuer of virtual currency to inflate it. As most
probable cause he sees negative network externality of all virtual goods sold,
and a finite horizon of profit-maximizing issuer. Under such conditions he finds
it optimal to maintain artificial scarcity of virtual goods, by selling it even above
standard monopoly price benchmark. The model proposed is possibly not only
relevant to producers of virtual goods, but also those of fashion goods or high-
tech consumer electronics, which show similar properties.
Final part of the work lays some new arguments to theory of free currencies,
grounded in ideas of Karl Menger regarding evolution of money. In particular it
supports the idea, that virtual currencies are in fact commodity money backed
by virtual goods, and that they might have potential to be persistently used as
means of payment in real transactions, side by side with real currencies. Al-
though many authors deny for such possibility by addressing the current state
as Nash equilibrium, natural monopoly or even public good, their denial of fur-
ther evolution might be seen rather as Schumpetarian lack of imagination, than
a real argument.
Through whole work, author has suggested several directions where further
research might go, and plans to engage in it as well. More importantly he in-
tends to keep and further extend very original datasets used in this work, and
make those available to other researchers.
What this work has not touched at all is the dimension of RMT from point
of welfare economics. The fact itself, that 400.000 Chinese workers today en-
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gage in production of “assets” which might be created by will of game operator
and a single mouse click, is quite alarming. Such line of thought also leads to
tempting idea of Blizzard company seeking extra profit by directly selling own
virtual currency.
Despite of effort to make text understandable for an economist without any
prior specific knowledge of virtual economies, some arguments are possibly hard
to follow. Author hopes that this work has helped to improve readers under-
standing of this topic to reader, and in advance apologizes for any confusion
caused.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Data collection methods
Price indices - API and MPI Over 33 days I created snapshot of data of all
items available at acution house (AH) at the moment, on each of 12 chosen Eu-
ropean realms. This was done using third party Auctioneer plugin, for standard
WoW client software. Afterwards I programmed an parser, able to transform
data saved by Auctioneer into MySQL database. The parser has been deliber-
ately written in PHP language, so that I could provide it as a service for other
players in form of online script available here http://www.mmometrics.org/aucdb2/
. Purpose of this was also to collect additional data, beyond my observed 12
realms - which was successful. This is how for example some data from US
realms were obtained - however not at regular basis that would be satisfactory
for use in broader statistical analysis.
Once I had broad panel of observations (8.5 millions of items), regarding
mainly item type(I) and buyout price (P), I started to choose reliable basket.
Problem of my observations was, that not all (of 35.000) item types are available
at AH each time. Hence we can not observe all prices from each snapshot. This
lead to problem of choosing right basket - it needed to be broad enough to really
capture overall price level, but not too broad to contain items for which there
was not enough data available. For following procedure (including choice of
consumption basket) I programmed a software - potentially reusable on larger
dataset.
Using a rule of thumb, that item going into consumption basket needs to be
observed at least in 90 % of observations is chosen a basket of 300 most traded
item types. Then an average minimum price, and average price are computed
for each item type I from chosen basket an as follows:
AMPI =
1
R ∗ T
∑
R,T
mini∈IR,T (Pi)
API =
1
R ∗ T
∑
R,T
avgi∈IR,T (Pi)
Where sum over R and T stands for all combinations of realm and time,
where was observed at least one item of type I, that is where set of items IR,T
was not empty. That means we sum over maximum of 33 ∗ 12 = 396 snapshots.
Now, once we have these aggregate prices we can actually compute price index
for each realm / day combination, using these averages as weights:
MPIR,T =
1
‖SR,T ‖
∑
I∈S(R,T )
mini∈IR,T (Pi)
AMPI
APIR,T =
1
‖SR,T ‖
∑
I∈S(R,T )
avgi∈IR,T (Pi)
API
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Where SR,T is a set of item types from consumption basket, observed in
time T on realm R. As a result we got two panels of indices measuring price
level - while MPI is more sensitive to Gold inflows, and better reflects actual
availability of goods(in terms of price), it is also more volatile. Note that we
generally used more stable average price index for estimating longer trends with
more variables, and more sensitive minimum price index for simpler equations
with less variables, where is lesser danger of overspecified model capturing its
larger random noise. However all regressions reported in this work have shown
similar results for both indices (which is certainly not case of all models I tried),
so their result are to be considered a little more robust, than statistical indicators
report.
It might be subject of critique that I did not take into account possibility
of changing consumption basket. Especially because my measurement took
place in time of 3.1.0 patch, when new items have been introduced, there is
good reason to suppose that consumption needs shifted - for which my fixed
basket did not account. To defend my approach: the consumption basket did
typically not contain any of items that might be substituted for newly introduced
ones (weapons and equipment). The most traded goods at AH (which has
been chosen into consumption basket) are resources for creating those items,
whose supply did not change during patch, and which have been most probably
consumed prior and after patch in roughly same proportions.
RMT Data Some part of data (year 2008) was achieved from Goldbuster
company, in form of SQL database dump. The data from 2009 was collected
directly from websites of 5 major Gold sellers (IGE, Swagvault, Bankofwow,
Guy4game and MySuperSales)51, where they report actual prices for each realm,
and in case of Swagvault company also daily sale volumes. For those purposes
I programmed a web crawler, which automatically collects such data. Even
though in this work I used only time series of 75 own observations, the crawler
keeps on collecting data, and will possibly provide reliable dataset for my further
research. Also I am going to publish the datasets to be available for other
researchers on my prepared mmometrics.org website.
Since RMT companies publish all of their prices in USD, the data needed to
be recalculated to other currencies as needed. For these purposes I used time
series from ECB modified as follows.
FX data As a source of data has been used panel from ECB available here:
http://www.ecb.int/stats/exchange/eurofxref/html/index.en.html However, here
the rates are reported only for workdays, and our other observations were made
7 days a week (this was perfectly reasonable - in fact the activity on WoW
realms peaks on weekends and holidays - and so posibly do RMT sales). Hence
for filling in missing FX data I used simple linear interpolation.
51For estimate of total RMT market shares (not only WoW) of those companies see
http://www.mmobux.com/articles/2270/ige-thsale-and-friends-gold-seller-revenues-in-2007
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Choice of observed realms For both price and RMT observation simple
random sample of realms was chosen as all realms starting with A with rea-
sonably high population. Later on Drak’Thul and Emerald Dream were added
because potentially interesting properties - high Czech population, and possi-
ble high number of Gold farmers. Later on I made also one-time snapshots of
several younger realms, however the age of realms in panel data used in most
estimations is the original one without young realms.
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7.2 Other results and figures
Figure 7: Artificial scarcity producer beaviour with small dampening effect
Figure 8: Artificial scarcity producer beaviour with large dampening effect
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Figure 9: Price stability of good with constant production cost
Figure 10: Price shift after production cost change - example 1
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Figure 11: Price shift after production cost change - example 2
Figure 12: Average Gold prices across various Realms
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Figure 13: Gold RMT prices of various sellers in US
Figure 14: Gold RMT prices of various sellers in EU
